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This in-depth study of health insurance schemes in Zaire recom-
mends developing more pilot insurance systems in areas where
health systems already function - and strengthening existing
systems through training, exchange visits, information systems,
and technical assistance.  Implementing a nationwide health  0
insurance system is not likely to be as successful as decentral-
ized, locally managed plans.  -.
The Policy, Research, and Extemal Affairs Complex  distributes PRE  Working  Papers  to disseminate the findings of work in progress and
to encourage the exchange of ideas among Bank  staff and all others interested in development issues. These papers carry the names of
the authors, rflect  only their views, and should be  used and cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the
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This paper -a  product of the Population, Health, and Nutrition Division, Africa Technical Department
- was written as part of the Africa Regional Study on  Health Financing to aid the ongoing sector
adjustmcnt dialoguc ir. Zaire. The study received outside financial support from SIDA, NORAD, and the
U.S. Agency for Intemational Development. It was prcsented at a seminar in April 1990. Copies of this
paper are availablc free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact
Karol Brown, room J9-112. extension 35073.
After identifying 12 systems of health insurance  * Simplc control methods, such as printed
in Zaire, Shcpard, Vian, and Kleinau prepared  premium stamps, detailed descriptions of enroll-
detailed case studies of four systems (two urban  ces, and the enrollment of entire families helped
and two rural) and brief studies of four others.  reduce fraud and error.
The case studies focused on the terms of the
insurancc plans, their organization and manage-  *  Appropriate investment strategies preserved
ment, resourcc mobilization, efficiency, equity,  the value of premium income. Investing in
client perccptions, and the quality of services.  imported drugs was a hedge against crosion of
Among the lessons Icamed:  the purchasing power of premia.
* Plans vary substantially in the services  *  Financial analysis of the insurance system
covcred. Consumers found coveragc of ambula-  requires better accounts. Fcw insurance plans
tory care attractivc despite substantial premia or  had good financial reports of the health delivery
required copayments.  Only half the plans  plan, much Icss of the insurance plan.
covcred inpatient care.
* A financial guarantor (for example, a
* The most successful schemes had modest  development organization guarantceing the first
premia.  year's services) boosts the public's confidence in
the insurance system.
* Acceptablc quality of service is a precondi-
tion for successful implementation of an insur-  *  Evidence of adverse selection and moral
ancc scheme.  hazard was found in most plans.  Their impact
can be moderated by requiring that the entire
* The implementation of voluntary schemes  family  joins or by cnrolling cmployce groups.
requircs publicity within the community at the
outset.  *  Informal associations exist that finance
members' hcalth care through intcrest-free loans
* The risk that insurance plans would be  to pay for births, hospitalizations, and other
ovcrcharged was limited by the decentralization  emergencies.
and direct management.
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AffairsComplex. Anobjective of the scries is to get thcse findings out quickly, even ifprcsentations arc less than fully  polished.
The findings, intcrprctations, and conclusions in thcsc papers do not necessarily reprcsent official Bank policy.
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This study of health  insurance systems in Zaire was carried  out as part of a larger  program
of  initiatives  (described  elsewhere) designed  to  improve  the sustainability  of  health  care
systems and  increase the health  status  of the Zairian  population  (1).  The objectives of tn'
study  are  presented  below,  followed  by  a  discussion  of  the  economic aspects  of  healt,
insurance,  background  information  about the heaith  sector and  health  financing  systems in
Zaire,  and highlights  of previous  related  work.  The introduction  ends with a summary of
methods used by the research team to collect and analyze data.
A.  OBJECTrIVES
The major motivations  for this study were:
1)  to  provide  information  for  the ongoing social sector adjustment  dialogue  in
Zaire; and
2)  to serve as a case study in the World Bank's Region Str-dy of Health  Finance,
which  is concerned  with  options for  mobilizing  additional  resources for  the
health  sector.
Specifically,  the study sought to document different  types of insurance systems in Zaire, and
to conduct in-depth  case studies of several schemes.
The  in-depth  case studies  presented  in  this  report  evaluate  the  design,  management  and
operational  efficiency  of four  health  insurance  programs from  both  rural  and  urban  areas.
The  case  studies  also  attempt  to  analyze  the  effects  of  insurance  on  equity  of  access,
utilization  of  health  care  services, and  mobilization  of  financial  resources  for  the  health
sector.  From  these  analyses,  the  report  draws  conclusions  about  the  advantages  and
disadvantages  of health  insurance programs as a means of  financing  health  care 3ervices in
Zaire, and suggests avenues for future  research, policy, and  programming initiatives.
B.  HEALTH INSURANCE
Health policy makers often propose health insurance as a possible health financing  mechanism
for developing  countries.  In theory, insurance  can mobilize additional  resources for  health
without  a drain  on the public sector and  without substantially  restricting  access; it can also
pose potential  problems, however, such as over consumption of services ("moral hazard") and
increases in medical prices and unit costs. This section reviews economic aspects of insurance
to provide a  theoretical framework  for the evaluation  of health  insurance systems in Zaire.
Health  insurance  is defined  as 'the  means by which  risks, or uncertain  events, are shared
between many people." (2)  The insurer  (or his agent) collects premiums which are  used to
compensate the insured  individuals  against financial  losses resulting  from  an insured event.
Insurance relies on the fact  that  people are willing to pay a premium to be compensated for
financial  losses from an event which might not happen.  Insurance also relies on the fact  that
events that  are risky or unpredictable  for a given individual,  can be highly predictable  for
large numbers of  people.  For insurance  to be feasible,  therefore,  risks must be 'pooled'  or
spread  widely among large numbers of  people, and  the risk events must  be independent  of
each other. (2)
Insurance systems are different  from prepayment systems because insurance systems provide
coverage for uncertain  future  events, while prepayment systems provide coverage for certain
future  events.  In  other  words,  insurance  systems  are  based  on  probabilities,  which
prepayment  systems are not.  In prepayment systems individuals  pay a set amount in advance
which  entitles  each covered  individual  to consume a specified  quantity  of services  in the
lfuture.  The price of the individuai  prepayment is set by multiplying  the average cost of the
covered services times the quantity  of services covered, plus a  fair  share  of administrative
costs and desired profit.  (If prepayment covers several services with different  costs, the fee
would be calculated by multiplying average cost times quantity  for each service, and summing
across services.)
Individuals  may favor  prepayment  in situations  where future  events are highly predictable,
but  future  cash  flow  is low or  unpredictable.  Demand  for  prepayment  systems does not
depend  on  risk  aversion,  and  has  little  to  do  with  the  individual's  assessment  of  the
probability  or likeliness of illness (it assumes a probability  of  1.0).
Insurance systems, on the other hand, require individuals  to pay a set amount in advance (the
premium)  which  entitles  them to consume services in  the  future  only  if  those services are
needed (i.e. if  illness occu-s).  Thus an element of uncertainty  is involved in insurance.  The
level of  the premium  is set by multiplying  the probability  that  an individual  will need the
covered services (i.e. the probability  of illness) times the average cost of the covered services,
plus a fair  share  of administrative  costs and desired profit.  Premium calculations  based on
the statistical  frequency  of disease in the population are called 'actuarially-based"  premiums.
Demand for  health  insurance  is influenced  by the  price of  the insurance  (premium),  and
individual's  assessment of the probability of financial  expenditures  resulting from illness, the
magnitude of those expenditures,  the individual's  income, and the degree to which he or she
is risk adverse.  These factors are especially difficult  to study in developing  countries, where
little  research has been conducted  on issues such as individuals'  perceptions  of probabilities
of loss and  willingness to pay to avoid risk.  Demand issues are critical  in LDCs, however,
since  many  people may lack  the  means and/or  will  e:  purchase  the  amount  of  insurance
coverage deemed secially desirable.  (2)
A further  distinction  between insurance  systems and prepayment  schemes is that  insurance
systems are redist.ibutive.  In insurance  systems, everyorte may pay  the same premium,  but
only sick individuals  will draw the benefits, whereas in prepay  nt schemes each participant
draws out benefits  equally to what he or she paid in initially.
Insurance  systems can  be organized  as  either  'direct'  or  'indirect."  In  direct  insurance
systems, the institution  responsible for financing  the health care services (the insurer)  is also
the provider, and  is responsible for making decisions about how those services are produced,
and  the amount  of services used to treat  patient.  Direct  insurance  systems are often  more
efficient,  since there are built-in  incentives  to keep down the cost of providing  services.  In
indirect  systems (also called 'third  party payor'  systems) the insurer  is a separate  entity  from
the health care provider.  Since the provider does not have to pay for the services, there is less
incentive  to manage costs efficiently.
Two potcntial  problems which can threaten  the financial  viability  of an insurance system are
"moral hazard'  and madverse  selection." these concepts are summarized briefly  below [a more
detailed  discussion may be found  in Mills (2)1.
'Moral  hazard'  is defined  as 'the  tendency of individuals,  once insured,  to behave in such a
way as to increase  the likelihood or size of the risk against  which they have insured."  Moral
hazard  refers to the danger that  insured individuals,  having paid a premium in advence,  will
demand  more services than they would have had they not  been covered by insurance.  The
problem occurs because individuals  no longer face a direct  payment at the time they consume
the services,  although  there  is still  a  cost to  produce  those  services.  This  is considered
inefficient  because the  marginal  cost of  the services consumed is more than  the  marginal
value of those services to the consumer.
Moral hazard  thus  results in  an 'over'  consumption of  health  resources.  Insurance  systems
2must  develop  safeguards  to  reduce  moral  hazard.  Frequently  used  methods  include  co-
insurance  (required  contributions  from  the insured  individual  for  his or her coverage) and
deductibles  (an  initial  amount  per  illness  episode  which  must  be  paid  by  the  insured
iuidividual before  the insurance covers the remainder  of expenses).  While co-insurance and
deductibles reduce the danger of moral hazard, they may also discourage insured  individuals
from seeking care  in a  timely manner, which can result in larger  health  care costs later  on.
(2)
A second potential  problem facing insurance systems is adver.e  selection.  Adverse selection
occurs  when individuals  at greater  risk  of illness are enrolled  in  an  insurance  program in
lqrger proportions  than they are found in the general population.  Individuals  at greater  risk
or  illness are  more likely  to  desire  insurance,  since losses from  illnesses are  more certain
events for  them.  However, if premiums are calculated based on the statistical  probability  of
illness in the general population,  an over-enrollment of individuals  who are at greater risk of
illness will cause costs to be greater than revenue, thus threatening  the financial  viability  of
the system.
The case studies  in this  report analyze how successful insurance  has been in spreading  risks
of  financial  losses associated  with  catastrophic  illness,  and  in  increasing  the  financial
resources  available  to  pay  for  health  care  services.  The  studies  also discuss  the  factors
influencing  demand  for  insurance  and  analyze  evidence  of  moral  hazard  and  adverse
selection.
C.  HEALTH SECTOR ORGANIZATION AND FINANCING IN ZAIRE
Although  Zaire  was  left  with  an  extensive  health  care  infrastructure  at  the  time  of
independence,  the health  care system deteriorated  progressively until  in  1977, less than  10%
of  the  population  had  access to  primary  health  care  services. (3)  Starting  in  the  1970's,
however, pilot projects were begun which promoted primary health care services such as basic
curative care, vaccinations and prenatal care through the establishment of networks of health
centers, each network centered around a reference hospital.  Often,  these hospitals and health
centers were managed by a church.
In  1975, these projects  became the model for  a national  proposal  to create  a decentralized
system of *health zones."  Each would be organized  around  a reference hospital  and contain
10 to 20 satellite  health centers, providing integrated  primary and secondary-level health care
services to  populations  of  approximately  100,000 residents.  The  proposal  became part  of
Zaire's  Five  Year  Health  Plan  in  1982, and  has been implemented  with  the support  of the
Government of Zaire (GOZ), the churches, and many international  donors.  As of 1989, over
100 of the 306 proposed health zones have been established and are functioning  well. In 1987,
over  46% of  Sh:  population  had  access to  primary  health  care  services (3).  Appendix  I
provides  a morr, detailed  explanation  of the organization  and  management structure  of  the
health  zones.
Zaire  has a range of health  care  financing  systems.  The most commoa form  of health  care
financing  is user fees, which  are administered  in a number  of ways.  A 1986 study  of ten
health  zones  revealed  that  nine  zones  charged  fees  per  episode  of  illi ess to  financing
ambulatory  curative  care.  (4)  With  this  payment  system,  follow-up  consultations  were
provided at no additional  charge.  In three of these nine zones, drugs and laboratory  test were
also included  in the episode price.
In most health  zones, the price of inpatient  care is calculated  according  to the number and
types of services and procedures provided (drugs, exams, bec. days, etc.). The per-case pricing
methodology in  practice at Bwamanda Hospital (described  in the first  case study  in Section
II) is encountered  less frequently.
3Two health zones in the Kivu Region, Kasongo and Kindu,  have employed a s stem of pricing
per  episode for  both  ambulatory  and  inpatient  care.  It  permits  the patient  to  receive all
services required,  for one set fee.  The hospital charges a referral  fee to the health  center for
each hospitalized  case referred.  While this  aystem achieves an important  social objective  of
assuring continuity  of care and access for people who might not otherwise be able to afford
inpatient  care,  it has not proved  financially  viable.  The nospital referral  fee reportedly  is
inadequate  to cover its operating  costs, but  the set fee c'nnot  be raised without  excluding
ambulatory  patients  with  minor illnesses.  Both zones rely on substantial  external  subsidies
from  international  donors to pay operating  costs.
According  to  the  manager  of  the  USAID-financed  Basic Rural  Health  Project  (SANRU),
several zones have also initiated  prepayment  systems using health  cards.  Area residents are
allowed to purchase the health card at a set price which entitles the bearer to a fixed number
of curative  care  visits.  The price is discounted  slightly  from  the full  price  which walk-in
patients  must  pay.  The advantage  of  this  system is not  necessarily  the cost saving  (since
inflation  may offset  any benefits  from price discounts), but  rather  that  it provides  farmers
with a way of paying for health  care when cash is available.
In the  formal  sector,  Zairian  laws require  that  employers pay  for  health  care services for
their  employees and employee's dependents.  Firm employees and  their dependents  represent
about  18%  to 27% of the country's  31 million population, according to two recent studies (1,S).
Some large enterprises  own and  run their  own health  facilities,  where they provide services
to employees and  dependents  at no charge.  Other  firms contract  with health  zones or other
private  providers  to treat  employees.
Finally,  there  are several health  insurance  programs functioning  in Zaire,  most managed  by
non-profit  or private  organizations.  These programs are the subject of this report.
D.  PREVIOUS  RELATED  WORK
I.  Health  Financing  Research:  User Fees vs. Insurance
Considerable  research  and policy analysis on health  financing  has been conducted  in Zaire,
including  studies sponsored by the GOZ, the World Bank, USAID/Kinshasa,  AID's PRICOR
and  REACH Projects, and other donors (1, 3-16).
The Health Zones Financing  Study, sponsorvd.  by the SANRU Project and REACH Project in
1986, examined the financial  performance  *.! ten well-functioning  health  zones, one in each
region  of  the  country.  The study  revealed  that  approximately  80 percent  of  health  zone
operating  expenses were being covered by user fees.  The remaining  expenses were financed
through  government  and private  subsidies, in equal proportions  (4).  Almost no ambulatory
care  is provided  free  of  charge  to  the  general  public  in  Zaire.  These surprising  results
provided  evidence  that  Zairians  were willing  and able to pay for  health  care services, and
indicated  the importance of the decentralized  community-managed health zone organizational
structure.
Other studies  have examined the different  incentives of fee-per-visit  versus fee-per-episode
payment systems (11), the effects  of inflation  on health zone pricing policies (7), determinants
of consumer demand for health care services (8,16) and deficiencies  in health zones' financial
management  information  systems (15).
This  research  has clearly  demonstrated  that  user fee systems have  increased  the financial
resources available  to the public health sector, resulting in an increase of utilization  of health
care services by the population.
Several  troubling  issues remain,  however.  Health  financing  experts  have  questioned  the
4equity and financial  viability  o,  health systems which rely so heavily on user fees, especially
with regard to expensive inpatient  care (17-20).
Bad debt is a documented problem in inpatient  care facilities,  and is the primary reason why
hospitals have the lowest rate of cost recovery of all health  iacilities  in Zaire (4).  For tnese
reasons,  a recent study concluded that user fees may not be the optimal financing  mechanism
for  inpatient  care (5).
In theory, insurance programs may avoid these problems, since the premiums are based on the
statistical  probability  of illness, and are therefore  set at a fraction  of the avcrage cost of a
hospitalization.  The population  may be more willing and  is certainly  more ab!e to pay  the
price of an insurance  premium than to pay the full  cost of inpatient  care.  Thus, compared
with  the current  user fee system, a hospital  insurance program has the potential  to mobilize
grcater and more steady financial  resourt'.  while providing protection to individuals against
the enormous burden of catastrophic  illness.
As early as 1986, rcscarchers in Zaire  identified  insurance systems and pre-paid  plans as an
additional  health financing  mechanism which could help protect individuals  against the cots
of catastrophic  illness, and at the same time provide a steady source of increased revenue for
the health  sector (4). Most recently, a paper commissioned by the World Bank in the course of
social sector adjustment  work reiterated  the potential advantages of health  insurance systems
in Zaire, especially in comparison with the current,  almost universal systems of user fees for
inpatient  services (5).
The study noted that Zairians  can expect to have high inpatient  expenditures  if they fall  ill
and  require  hospitalization,  given the user fees  now in  place.  Perceiving  that  they will be
faced with such high expenditures  when hospitalized, sick individuals  can take three actions:
1) avoid  sceking care at all;  2) obtain  care and  spend a large portion  of  annual  disposable
income  or  sell  household  assets to  pay  for  it;  or  3) obtain  care  and  not  pay  for  it,  thus
increasing  the hospital's  burden  of  bad debt.  Whatever option is selected, the outcome  is
negative.  In the first  two cases, the individual's  welfare is harmed by not seeking necessary
care, or by being forced to spend a large portion of very limited  household resources on one
episode or treatment.  In the last case, the financial  sustainability  of the health  care provider
is undermined  by the extra  burden  of frec care provided to inpatients.
Given  the success of Zaire's  user fee system in mobilizing  resources to finance  ambulatory
care, the case for  insurance  programs for  ambulatory  care is less strong.  Insurance  may be
desirable,  however,  as  a  way  to  stimulate  demand  for  services,  if  under-utilization  is  a
perceived problem.
2.  GOZ Commission on the Organization  of Insurance  Systems
At the same time, the Government of Zaire has sh,  '  i great concern for insurance programs.
In  1989,  the  Conseil  Executif  commissioned  an  insurance  systems  study  (Mission
d'Organisation  des Mutualites) which  included  four parts:
I)  An  inventory  of  existing  *mutual  associations" (a  term  that  includes  many
different  types of formal  and informal  clubs and cooperatives);
2)  A public opinion survey;
3)  Plans for proposed changes in laws regarding  the organization  of insurance  in
Zaire;
4)  Options for  pilot testing and alternatives  for organization,  financing,  training
and promotion of insurance  programs (13).
5Results of the inventory and cpinion survey are summarized briefly  below. Some of the othei
proposals suggested by the Commission are mentioned later in this report.:
In  1989, the Commission attempted  to  conduct  an  inventory  of all  mutual  associations  in
Zaire.  Difficulties  in  communication  linmited the focus to  about  1,000 associations  in  t1-e
Kinshasa area,  however.  A total  of 562 associations (mostly informal)  completed the survey
form.  Some associations were contacted directly;  others were identified  through  government
administrative  channels and by announcements on public radio.
The  survey  defined  a mutual  association  very  loosely.  All  types of  formal  and  informal
groups were targeted,  including  cultural  groups, agricultural  and  handicraft  cooperatives,
health  zones, and savings organizations.
The inventory  found  that  most informal  associations were small (less than 50 members) and
require a monthly contribution  of between 100 to 500 Z in order  to finance  certain  benefits.
About  30% of  the  associations  surveyed  provided  financial  assistance  in  case  of  illness.
Finan..al  assistance was also provided  for  events such as a  death  in  the family,  marriage,
birth,  or  other  fintancial  problems.  The GOZ findings  about  informal  associations  were
similar  to the findings  of the World Bank team research, discussed in Section I.
The  inventory  a!so described  ten, more formal  assoc.ations (numbers  I through  10) which
offer  or a-e planning  to offer  some form of health  insurance.  In the course of the present
study,  two  additional  systems were  identified  (number  11 and  12).  All  12 systems are
described in Section II.
1.  Bwamanda Health Zone, Equateur  Region
2.  Bokoro Hlealth Zone, Bandundu  Region
3.  St. Alphonse Health Center, Kinshasa
4.  Caisse de Solidarite Ouvriere et Paysanne (CASOP), Kinshasa
5.  Reseau Medecins de Familles (REMEF), Kinshasa
6.  Masisi Health  Zone, Kivu Region
7.  Mutuelle 'Union  et Prtvoyance'  (UPM), Kinshasa
8.  Mutualite de Solidarite  Chretienne,  Kinshasa
9.  MUZAS, Kinshasa
10.  LETISSA, Kinshasa
I.  Sona Bata Health  Zone
12.  SNHR Employee Cooperative in Rutshuru.
The  public  opinion  survey,  also  in  1989, interviewed  850 individuals  in  Kinshasa  from
different  socio-economic levels and  professional  groups  to  learn  about  the  Prevalence  of
membership  in  mutual  associations  and  perceived  advantages  and  disadvantages  to
membership.
Sixty-three  percent  of  respondents  were  members of  some sort  of  mutual  association  (not
necessarily  related  to  health).  About  half  of  current  members responded  that  they  were
satisfied  with how the association operated.  For those who were dissatisfied,  the key reasons
were financial:  either a lack of sufficient  financial  resources, or irregularity  of contributions
by members. The survey also detailed  reasons why people join mutual associations, and what
role members saw for the State.  On the latter  question, most respondents  saw the State's role
as one of 'encadremento  rather  than supervision or management.
I This  report does not attenpt  to analyze the legal changes proposed in the Commission
report.  While legal issues will become very important as the insurance industry  develops, they
were not considered of primary  interest  for  the initial  evaluation  of existing systems.
6E.  SUMMARY OF R_EARCH  METHODS
Duririg the three-week  study,  the team collaborated  closely with  the members of  the GOZ
Commission.  The team conductece interviews  with  officials  from  various  government  and
non-governmental  agencies,  including  the  World  Bank  office  and  the  Programme
d'adjustement  des Secteurs Sociaux  (PASS) project  in  Kinshasa,  USAID and  the  USAID-
sponsored Sante Rural (SANRU) Basic Rural Health Project, Zaire's Expanded Immunization
Program (EPI), the Cooperation Medicale Belge au Zaire,  Projet Sante Pour Tous, Kinshasa
(SPTK), and the Center for  Integrated  Development.
The team reviewed data already  collected by the GOZ Commission, in particular  the opinion
survey  and  sur-cy  of  existing  mutual  associations.  Through  this  review,  four  health
insurance  plans  were  selected  for  in-depth  study:  two  offered  by  rural  health  zones
(Bwamanda arnd Bokoro) and two which cover ambulatory  care services in Kinshasa (CASOP,
offered  by the  Syndicat  National  UNTZA, and  St. Alphonse, a  community-initiated  plan
assisted by SPTK and  the Catholic Church).  More information  about  how the case studies
were selected is presented in Section 11.
Members of  the team  visited  Bwamanda  and  Bokoro, interviewing  medical  staff  there  to
obtain  detailed  information  about  organization  and  management  of  the  insurance  plans,
premiums and  enrollment  rates, etc.  71 hospital patients  in Bwamanda and Bokoro, and  26
residents in  Bokoro Zone were surveyed  to obtain  information  about  satisfaction  with  the
program,  and  to  compare  characteristics  of  members and  non-members.  Financial  and
utilization  records were reviewed in both zones, to evaluate evidence of moral hazard and/or
adverse selection, and to measure the effects  of health  insurance  on the financial  condition
of health  facilities  and  the health status  of the population.
In Kinshasa,  team  members collected  descriptive  information  and  reviewed  financial  and
utilization  data from the facilities  in which these plans were based (St. Alphonse and CASOP).
A 205-patient  survey  was also  conducted.  Finally,  team  members  visited  several  other
insurance  systems in the Kinshasa area.
To supplement  information  about formal  hcalth  insurance  plans, information  was gathered
from 22 informal  savings associations (uuikelemba'  and wmoziki'),  which sometimes come to the
aid of members with catastrophic  illness.
7IL  CASE STUDIES  DESCRIPTIONS  AND  IMACTS
This  section  provides  information  about  eight  insurance  programs,  seven  of  which  were
selected from  the  ten mutual  associations  identified  by the  GOZ Commission as offering
health  insurance  programs.  The eight insurance  programs (and  their original  number) are:
l.  Bwamanda Health Zone
2.  Bokoro Health Zone
3.  St. Alphonse Health Center
4.  Caisse de Solidarite Ouvriere et Paysanne (CASOP)
5.  Reseau Medecins de Familles (REMEEF)
6.  Masisi Health Zone
7.  Mutuelle "Union et Prevoyance" (UPM)
12.  SNHR Employee Cooperative in Rutshuru
The other  four  known insurance  programs (numbers  8 through  ll)  were not reviewed  here
either  because plan officials  were not available  for interviews no. 8 (Mutualite de Solidarite
Chretienne,  and  no. 10 LETISSA) or because the systems are not functional  (no. 9 MUZAS,
and  no. II Sona Bata)."
From those programs reviewed,  the team selected associations I through  4 for in-depth  case
analysis.  These schemes were  chosen for  several  reasons. First,  the  team  wanted  to study
insurance  systems which had  been operating  for at least a year, and  for  which information
about  utilization  and  financial  performance  was  available.  Program  no.  12,  a  small
cooperative, may have been less than a year old.  The team wanted enrollment  of at least 1000
members so that  utilization  rates would be stable.  This criterion  eliminated  programs nos. S
(REMEF), 7 (UMP), and  again  12 (SNHR cooperative).  In  addition,  the  team  wanted  to
analyze insurance systems in both rural  and urban  settings, covering different  types of care
(e.g. ambulatory,  hospital).  Finally,  travel  and  communications  were clearly  a  constraint,
given the short duration  of the study.  The health  insurance plan in the rural  zone of Masisi
was not selected for this reason.  Tables  I1.1  through  11.3  summarize pertinent  characteristics
of the four plans.  Each of the case studies then provides detailed description  of (l) the terms
of the insurance,  (2) organization  and management, (3) effect  on resource mobilization,  and
(4) effects  on  utilization  and  access.  A brief  sketch  of  the remaining  four  plans  (nos. S
tnrough  7 and  12) follows.
The section also includes  information  about  informal  savings associations,  some of  which
offer  financial  assistance to members in times of need.
2 MUZAS is a proposed centralized national  health insurance  plan, described in the GOZ
Commission report.
8Table 11.1 Description  of Models  in  Case  Studies,  Part 1
NAME  OF PLAN  BWANANDA  ST.  ALPHONSE  8OKORO  HEALTH  ZONE  CASOP/UNTZA
INSURANCE  PLAN  INSUJRANCE  PLAN  "ABONNEMENT"
.........  .. .. .....  . ......................  ......  I-  --  - - - - - - - - - - - - --  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
REGION  Equateur  Kinshase  Bandundu  Kinshasa
RURAL/URBAN  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban
TYPE OF MANAGEMENT  Health  Zone  One health  center  Health  Zone  UNTZA
Assisted  by the  Center  uithin  a health  Assisted  by  medical  staff  (Zairian  National
for  Integrated  Development zone:  assisted  by  of  the  Belium  Cooperation  Workers  Union)
(CDI),  a  project  started  SPTK  and  Catholic
by  Belgian  votunteers  parish
DATE  STARTED  April,  1986  February,  1987  1985  1968
ELIGIBLE  1986:  118,612  1989:  10,000  residents  of  1986:  112,911  1989:  3 million  (pop.
POPULATION  1987:  125,480  catchments  area  of  St  1987:  116,815  of  the  city  of  Kinshasa)
1988:  130,000  Alphonse  Health  Center  1988:  109,685
1989:  134,680  1988:  110,000
NLWBER  OF MEMBERS  1986:  32,750  (28X)  1987-89:  cumulative  1988:  4,410  (4X)
(ENROLLMENT  RATE)  1987:  58,100  (46X)  enrollees  1689  (17X)  1989:  4,444  (4%)
1988:  80.595  (62X)  1989:  620 (6X)  1989:  6,691  in  Kinshasa
1989:  81,142  (60X)  (0.2X)
SERVICES  Hospital:  all  types  Curative  care  outpatient  Primary  outpatient  care  Outpatient  curative  care
COVERED  of  haspitalization  inc.  visits  at  a  fixed  price  including  most  drugs,  at  a  flat rate  per  day
deliveries  (w/prenatal  per episode,  including  laboratory  exams,  forms,  including  essential  drugs
care).  Health  center:  basic  drugs  and up  to 4  consultations  at  reference
chronic  care treatment  follow-up  visits  hospital  if  referred.
SERVICES  Hospital:  deliveries  Laboratory  exan,  special  Hospital  irpatient  care,  Laboratory  tests;  special
NOT COVERED  w/o prenatal  care;  drugs  above  nor  al health  chronic  diseases,  STDs,  drugs  not included  in
private  doctor  visits  center  stock.  Doesn't  deliveries,  Preventative  health  center  drug List
Health  center:  all  cover  hospital  care,  del-  care,  MCH,  FP,  antibiotics hospital  inpatient  care;
care  except  chronic  iveries,  or  preventive  care  &  injections  deliveries,  Ante-natal
care,  MCH
UNIT  CF ENROLLMENT Individual;  however,  if  Individuat  Individual,  however,  if  one Femily  membrship
one  eiber of  a  family  membr  of  a family  joins,
joins,  all  mebers  must  alt  mist  join.
join
9Table  11.2  Description  of  Models  in  Case  Studies,  Part  2
............  .......  .......  ..................................................................................................................
NAME  OF  PLAN  BWANANDA  ST.  ALPHONSE  80YORO  HEALTH  ZONE  CASOP/UNTZA
INSURANCE  PLAN  INSURANCE  PLAN  "ABONNEMENTO
...................  ...........................  ...........................  ...........................  .........................
PREMIUM  PRICE  Premiun per  household  mom.  1987:  50 2  1985  1989:  600 2  1989:  100-200 Z/month
PER  YEAR  186:  20 Z  1988: 100 Z  1989:  1,200 Z  One time  fee  of  100 Z  for
1987:  30 Z  1989: 300 Z  Paid  100X  by  mpaoyer.  wemership booktet
1989: 125 Z
00  ALL  MEMBERS  Yes  Yes  Yes  No. 3  tevets  of  contribu-
FACE  THE  SAKE  PRICE  tions  depending  on  income
CO-PAYMENTS  20X  for  slt  hospital  meebers  pay  a  flat  fee  25  X for  covered  services;  Meybers  pay a  fee per  day
and health  center  serv.  per  episode (500 Z In  1989) All  excluded services  (450 Z for  indiv.  members
except deliveries  w/  Vatid  for  5 days.  are  charged  at full  rates.  in  1989).
prenatal  care  (free)  Paid  100X  by  rployer.
DEDUCTIBLES  None  None  Norne  None
PRICES  FACED  BY  Uninsured are  treated  Non-merkers  pay per visit.  Uninsured are treated  at  Uninsured are treated  at
UNINSURED  at  full  charges.  Three  Price  includes  basic  drugs.  futl  charges.  higher  prices
payor  categories  for  In  1989,  first  visitu400  Z,
non-memoers  (1)  employer-  follow-up  visits  *  150  2
billed,  (2)  non-resident
(3)  all  others
LIMIT ON  MAXIKMI  No  Five day  timit  for  episode.  At discretion  of  health  No
SERVICES  TO  A  personrel  in  case  of
MEMBER  excessivw  utilization.
UTILIZATION  REVIEW/  No  No  Each  treatment  Episode  is  No
CASE  MANAGEXENT  noted on *eSbership  docu-
ment,  including  drugs
coauwed.
QUALITY  OF  CARE  Stockouts  rare;  several  Stockouts  rare;  no doctors;  Stockouts  rare,  several  Stockouts  rare,  two
doctors  and well-trained  several  uell-trained  nurses doctors  end  well-trained  doctors  rd  several  well-
rnirses  (some expatriates)  (some  expatriates);  nurses (same  *xpatriates);  trained  nurses;  infra-
infrastructure  good.  infrastructure  good.  infrastructure  good.  structure  fair.
VOLUNTARY/  Votuntary;  but  if  one  Votuntary  Voluntary;  but  if  one  Voluntary  except if
COMPULSORY  family  wmbeer  joins,  fmily  enIer  Joins,  compeny  joins,  employees
all  mist  join  all  *ut join.  must pay contribution
TYPE  OF INSURANCE  Direct,  offered  by provider  Direct,  offered  by provider  Direct,  offered  by provider  Direct  but  my  change
ACCOJNTING  Irsurance  pLan aectg kept  Accounting for  plan  Is  Accounting for  plan  is  Accounting for  plan  is
seperate.  Hosp. & heaLth  co ired  with  health  center  combined  with  health  center  cebined  with  polyctinic
centers  bill  the  plan  for  accounting.  accounting.  accounting  in  same  aspects
services rendered.
ADMINISTRATIVE  5.7U  of  premiues  Not distinguished  from  Not knoum  Not known
COSTS  health  center  adin.
10Table  11.3  Description  of  Models In  Case  Studies,  Part  3
NAKE  OF PLAN  BWAMANDA  ST. ALPHONSE  BOKORO  HEALTH  ZONE  CASOP/UNTZA
INSURANCE  PLAN  INSURANCE  PLAN  "AAONNEMENTU
..................  ..........................  .......................  ...........................  ..................
VERIFICATION  OF  AtL  hospital  cases must  Clerk  checks meitership  Registration  form with  all  Present meebership card
INSURANCE  STATUS  be referred  from  HC.  card and compares  to  member  names  exists  In  (with  photo)  or  give
MC  checks  im  eership  card  national  ID  card.  dupticate  at  heaLth  center employee  ID  number
against  family  health  Sautimes  clerk  checks  and  with  household.  Family
card.  Clerk  at  hosp.  aelso  against  mwb, register  form  presented  during
checks card against  ember-  consultation.
ship  register
ENROLLMENT  PERIOD 8  weeks  per  yr,  Feb-Apr,  Any  time  during  year,  Any time  duping  year.  Any time  during  year.
following  harvest  period  except  sick  people  aren't
aLlowed to  join  and receive
care  immedistely at emaber-
rates
DURATION  OF  BENEFIT  One  year  One  year  One  year  As long  as  monthly  dues
paid
INVESTMENT  OF FUND Fuid  Is  invested  at CDI  Funds  are  kept  at perish. Local  expenses  are dedcted  None
(2.5-3X  interest  per  month)  Not  Invested.  from  revenues,  balence
or  loaned to  pharmacy  to  entirely  used for  referred
purchase drugs.  patients  and  central
operating  costs.
FINANCIAL  SITUATION  Every year,  plan  has  Unknown  Underfinanced prior  to  1989 Unknown
OF PLAN  covered expnses.  In  1989  10X  morkup  at  present
plan  will  need to  use  utilization  rate  of  members
surplus  from previous  years
to  cover expenses
TOTAL  PLAN  REVENUE  1986: unknown  Unknown  1986: unknown  1989: 403,980 Z
(INCL.  INTEREST)  1987:  2,245,752 Z  1987: unkrxmn
1988:  4,958,855 Z  1988: 2,646,000 Z
1989: 10,887,846 Z (proj.)  1989: 5,332,800 Z  (proj.)
TOTAL  PLAN  EXPENSES  1986: unknown  Unknown  UnknIwn  Unknown
1987:  1,736,878 Z
1988:  4,802,190 Z
1989: 11,125,106 Z (proj.)
FINANCIAL  SITUATION  Cost recovery  st  hospitel  Highly profitable.  Over  Health  centers  cover their  Unknown,  but  looks
OF HEALTH  FACILITY  increased by 30X  between  50  excess revenue over  operating  expenses inc.  profitable
185  and  1988.  expenses  In  1989  supervision  and
Health  centers  recover over  (projected).  adeinistration  by BCZS
lOOK  of  costs.
CHANGES  IN  Hoepitel  utilization  rates  Unknown  Plan mebers  have 11 to  12 MNasers  seem  to  make  more
UTILIZATION:  higher  for  members  then for  times  higher  utilization  follov-Lp  visits  than
nor-mmsbers.  than uminsured & urWmloyed non-mtbers
4%  (mubers)  conume 31X
...................................................................................................................................
11A.  CASE STUDY  OF  BWAMANDA
The health  zone of Bwamanda, located in the Equateur  Region of Zaire,  operates under  the
medical services of the Center for Integrated  Development (CDI) of Bwamanda.  The CDI was
started  in  1969 with  assistance  from  Belgian missionaries,  to support  economic and  social
development,  including  agriculture,  health,  nutrition,  and  infrastructure.  The health  zone's
1989 population  of 134,682  is served by a 156-bed reference hospital, 20 comprehensive health
centers, and two smaller  health posts.
The following section gives a brief introduction  to the insurance plan operating  in Bwamanda,
and its context.  The section describes the terms of the insurance  package, charactcristics  of
the population served, and the organization  and management of the plan. Subsequent sections
describe the financial  condition  of the insurance plan and  the hospital, and analyze issues of
efficiency,  cquity,  and demand  for services.
This  discussion  draws  on  previous  work  by  health  zone  staff  and  other  research  teams,
reported  in several documcnts; Moens (1988), Bitran  (1986), Vian and  Nsembani (1986), and
Bwamanda Health  Zone (1985-1988) (Annual  Reports of the Health Zone).
1.  Terms of the Insurance  Plan
Several concerns led decision makers to consider the development of an insurance  plan as a
health  financing  option for the zone of Bwamanda.  Most important,  the zone's medical staff
wished  to  increase  economic access to health  care  and  to  improve the  hospital's  financial
situation.  Regarding  access, fluctuations  in income due to seasonality  of crops meant that  it
was not easy for individuals  to pay the full cost of a hospitalization.  Medical staff  were also
concerned that  individuals  who had becn referred  to the hospital were delaying several days
to come, in order  to gather  enough money to pay for the care (14).
Regarding  the financial  situation  of the hospital, a study in 1986  showed that the hospital had
recovered less than half of its operating  expenses through  user fees in  1985. Compared to the
eight other hospitals analyzed by Bitran et al, Bwamanda performed the worst in share of costs
recovered  from patients  (4).
The process of  designing the insurance  plan included  considerable  participation  from  both
medical staff  (including  health  center  nurses) and  the communities.  First  , hospital  staff
discussed the acceptability  of the plan with health  center  nurses.  Through  these workshops
discussions, the basic parameters of  the plan were set, for  example, a small so-payment,  no
deductible,  and annual  collection  rather  than semi-annual  premiums.  The idea of covering
ambulatory  care  through  the  insurance  plan  was also discussed  during  these  preliminary
workshops.  Overwhelmingly,  the  nurses rejected  this  idea  because they  believed  it would
result in overutilization  of medical services (14).
At  the  level  of  the  community,  meetings  were  held  to explain  the  basic elements  of  the
proposed  insurance  plan, and  to ask  community  members for  their  preferences  regarding
premium  and  co-payment  levels.  Presented  with  two  options,  the  communities  expressed
preference  for  a  higher  premium  and  lower co-payment  (14).  Health  zone staff  regularly
solicit community opinion regarding  the health insurance plan, through  the CDI's community
development  committees.
The  Bwamanda  insurance  plan  covers  hospitalizations  (including  deliveries),  dental
extractions,  and ambulatory  surgery (circumcisions) at the Bwamanda Hospital.  Covered care





Obstetrics (where mother has attended  prenatal  convsultations)
Gynecology
The insurance plan also covers the cost of treatment  of chronic illness at the health center and
health  post.
Each clinical  service has one to four  sub-departments,  bringing the total number of covered
hospital clinical  services to 14.
Two add-tional  clinical  services have been designated  by the hospital but are not covered by
the insurance plan. These are: 1) private doctor visit or physical examination, and 2) deliveries
of mothers not enrolled  in prenatal  consultations.  Including  these two services, the hospitil
has a total of 16 clinical services. The Bwamanda hospital has employed a system of flat rate
charges for episodes of illness or hospitalization  for  10 years.
The  charge  varies  by  payor  category.  A  list  of  hospital  services,  along  with  pricing
information  according  to  payor  category,  is attached  in  Annex  II.  Each  price  covers all
resources  required  for  treating  the  inpatient  episode,  including  nursing,  doctor  visits,
laboratory  and  X-rays, pharmacy,  operating  room time, housekeeping  and  supervised  day
treatment, etc. The standard price given in column A, applies to an uninsured  patient included
in  the zone census.  A non-member (column B) generally  pays 20% of  the  standard  price.
People from outside the Zone (i.e. not in  the census) generally pay twice the standard  price;
employed persons whose employer pays directly  pay 250%  of the standard  price.
The population  eligible to join the insurance plan includes all residents of the health zone of
Bwamanda.  Villages are often very large (1,000 to 2,000 inhabitants);  the population  density
is 54 persons per square kilometer.  Health centers usually serve between 4,000 to 8,000 people,
and  99% of the population  lives within  7 kilometers of a health  center (14).
According to the health zone census, about 17%  of the population are children  under  five.  In
a  1987 survey of  518 households, about half  the households reported  annual  revenue  of less
than  7,500 Zaires  ($58).'  The same survey  showed an  average  household  contained  five
children  and  7 to 8 members overall.
About 90% of the population of the health zone are farmers.  The major crops are coffee, soy
beans, corn, cotton, peanuts and cassava.  In some parts of the zone, fishing  is an important
activity.  About 4.6%  of the zone's population are salaried  employees and their families.  These
employees work for private or parastatal companies.  The largest of these employers is the CDI
itself,  with  617 employees (a total  of 3,480 covered beneficiaries).  An unknown  number of
residents earn salaries working for small shops or other small businesses.
Table A.l shows the evolution  of membership in the insurance  plan, from  1986 to 1989.
To better characterize  insured  and uninsured  patients,  the study team interviewed  50 of the
196 hospitalized  patients  in a systematic survey hospitalized  on November 2 or November 3,
1989.  The questionnaire  (in Lingala)  is in  Annex V.  Table A.2 compares the insured  and
uninsured  inpatients  who used the hospital.  Insured  patients  were more like'v  to be female
and  were  less educated.  Otherwise,  there  were  no noticeable  differences.  As only  one
respondent  was employed, it was not possible to separate ordinary  uninsured  and  employed
3  The Zaire, the unit of currency  of Zaire, has been subject to rapid inflation.  As of the
time of this study (mid-October, 1989) one US dollar was worth 430 Z officially  and about 470
Z on the parallel  market.
13Table  A.1  Swanmnda  Health  Insurance Plan
Menbership  Rates  1986  1989
.........................  ...............................
1986  1987  1988  1989
.............................  ..............................................  .......  .....................
Neffbers  32750  58100  80595  81142
Total  Population  118612  125480  130000  134680
Percentage  enrolled  27.6  46.3X  62.02  60.2X
Change  in  enrollment
rate (prcentage)  18.72  15.72  -1.72
......................  ..........................................  ................
*1989 population  estimated based on  growth rate  of 3.6X
patients.  Table V.1 in Annex V analyzes missing data to show how various ambiguities  in the
survey were resolved.
Table A.2 Survey of  50 Bwamanda  HospitaL  Patients:  Frequ  ncies
.................................................  ..  ....
X  of  Respondents:  Numbers
Insured  Uninsured  used
Characteristic  (0a29)  (0Zi)
..................  ......................................  .....  ......................
Gender:
FemaLe  69  X  43X  S0
Nale  31X  57X
What  do you think  of  the  idea of
health  insurance?
Good  1002  61X  S0
Don't know  02  10l
Could you pay 10,000 Zaire  for  an  50
illress  episode  requiring  minor surgery
in  a hospital?
Yes  522  43X
No or  no response  48X  482
How  would you pay this  unot?  35
Installment  252  272
Cash  752  73X
Uhere  would you get  the  money?  48
Cah  from houehold  72  102
Sav!ng club  or  association  42  02
By selling  household itwn  _32  252
outside  the  hou shold
Contribution  of  a fmi  ly  m*bers  7r  402
other  362  252
No  response  32  02
Did  you go to  school?  so
Not at  all  662  382
Pr1mary school,  1-3 years  17X  192
Primry  school,  4-6 years  102  142
Secondary  school  7r  29X
14Does  your househctd grow:
Soya  76X  76X  50
Corn  93X  86S  50
Coffee  45X  52X  50
Does your houschold have a:
Radio  a  5S  50
Sewing  machine  10%  10X  50
Bicycle  34X  19X  50
The insarance  premium for  1989 was set at 125 Z ($0.35) per person.  In theory,  if a family
wishes to enroll in the plan, all members of the family  must be enrolled, although this practice
is not always followed (see discussion, section 2). The size and composition of the family are
determined  from  the  family  health  card,  which  is filled  out  for  every family  in  the zone
during  the health  zone census completed every two years.  All adults wishing to enroll in the
plan face the same premium.  Table A.3 shows premiums for  1986-1989:
Table A.3 Amual Premium  for
Bwamada  Insurance Plin,  Per Person  '
...  ........  .............................................
NOMINAL  1986  1986
YEAR  ZAIRES  DOLLARS  I  ZAIRES  DOLLARS
....................................................
1986  20  s0.33  20  $0.33
1987  30  S0.23  22.9  $0.38
1988  so  50.27  24.6  50.40
1989  125  S0.35  28.8  50.47
'Exchange rates  and  infiation  rates  are  found in  Anex  111.
The insurance  plan employs co-payments but  no deductibles.  In  1989 the co-payment  was
established  at 20 percent  of the standard  flat-rate  charge  for  13 of  the  14 covered  charge
categories. (Payor  A, the most common payment  category, is for  non-insured  zone residents
whose health care is not paid through hospital billing to an employer, as described later in this
section.)  The exception is obstetrical  care to women who were enrolled  in  prenatal  care; in
these cases, no co-payment  is charged.  The 20 percent  co-payment applies  to treatment  of
chronic  illness cases at the health  center level as well.
During  1988, the health  zone experimented  with a system of variable  rates for co-payment,
depending  on the distance  from the hospital.  Plan members who lived furthest  (over 50 km)
away  from  the hospital of the patient  were charged  only a 5% co-payment, compared  to  10
percent  for those living 25 to 50 km and 20 percent for those who lived closest (under  25 km).
The plan asked nurses to make a special effort  at enrollment  especially in outlying areas.
When the hospital staff  reviewed the insurance plan at the end of 1988, they thought that the
system had not increased access for members living far  from the hospital.  It was difficult  to
control, as well, leading the zone to abandon it in  1989. According to Figure  A.l, however,
which  shows the  relationships  between  insurance  status  and  distance,  the  1988 program
changes (either  the variable  co-payment rates, the stepped-up awareness campaign, or both)
may have influenced  the decision of distant  residents to enroll in the program.  Enrollment
declined less with distance from Bwamanda center in 1988  than in the three other years of the
insurance plan.  There is a clear decrease of the membership rate the further  the villages are
away from Bwamanda for  1986, 1987  and  1989. Regression analysis confirmed  that  the slope
15was significantly  negative (p <  .05) for all the years except  1988.
There is no evidence that  the stepped-up awareness campaign was effective  for the close-in
health  centers.  The enrollment  rate of villages about 75 km away  was 35 percentage  points
higher than it would have been based on patterns from other years.  The squares in Figure A.l
show the actual  observations  for  1989 as an  indication  of the variability  about the overall
pattern.  Each observation  corresponds to one of the 21 health centers.
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Figure  A.l
The  Bwamanda  plan  has  two important  controls  on  covered expenses.  First,  all  covered
services are provided only by referral.  Second, the flat  rate charges limit the plan's expenses
for each admission.
Since the insurance  system is offered  by the provider, there  is no reimbursement  system and
thus  no "cap" on spending  use by  the member.  There  are  no limits  placed  on care-givers
regarding  the maximum number of services (patient  days, laboratory  tests, etc.) or expenses
used to  treat  a  patient.  Standard  treatment  protocols do exist,  and  the doctors  and  other
medical staff  make efforts  to follow them. There are no systems for utilization  review or case
management,  however.
The insurance plan is voluntary;  however, if one member of a family wishes to join, all family
members are required  to pay the premium. This is intended  to reduce adverse selection, where
only those who know they will probably need insurance  subscribe to the plan.
16The hospital continues to treat  the uninsured,  but at prices which are sometimes higher than
the full payment on behalf of insured residents.
There are three types of uninsured  patients  treated at the hospital:  Payor Category C:  non-
residents;  Payor  Category  D:  salaried  employees, and  their  families,  whose  health  care
expenses are paid through hospital billing to the employer; and Payor Category A: health zone
residents who do not fall  into Payor Category D and decided  not to join the insurance  plan.
Members of the insurance  plan fall  into Payor Category B.
For the purposes of this discussion, therefore,  four categories of patients  exist:
PAYOR
CATEGORY  DESCRIPTION
...  .........  .................................................
A  Uninsured  health  zone residents without  an employer who pays
the health  zone directly  for employee care
B  Insured residents
C  Non-residents (not eligible for insurance plan)
DA  Employees whose employer  pays  the  health  zone directly  for
services
As  noted earlier,  a  full  list of  prices of  hospital  services according  to  payor  category  is
provided  in Annex II.
Annex IV discusses procedures for fee collection cnd describes how free care and bad debt are
handled.  Patients  who cannot afford  to pay are not turned away from  Bwamanda Hospital,
but are treated  and allowed to pay in installments.
2.  Organization  and  Management
The insurance plan began enrollment in April,  1986. During the first  two years of operation,
the insurance  plan covered onty hospital services; coverage of chronic illness treatment  at the
health  center  level was added in  1988.
The Bwamanda insurance plan is offered by the provider -- the Bwamanda Rural Health Zone.
Accounting  for the insurance plan is kept separate  from that  of the health  zone.
The price of  the premium  is set both to be 'affordable',  and to cover the expected hospital
4 All employers are responsible by law under the 'Code de Travail'  for providing or paying
for  the  health  care  services  for  their  employees.  Some  employers  (in  particular,  the
Government  of  Zaire)  do  not  respect  this  law.  Bwamanda  residents  who  are  salaried
government employees therefore fall into payor categories A or B, depending on their decision
to join the  insurance  plan.  Other  employers may decide  to reimburse  employees for  their
expenses (for example, employees in small shops, and domestic help), rather  than having the
hospital bill the employer.  In such a case, the employee would again fall into category A or
B, depending on whether the employer encouraged the employee to join the health insurance
plan.  The  prices  for  payor  category  D are only  valid  for  those  employers  who have an
agreement with the hospital and other health zone facilities  whereby the health zone bills the
employer for the services provided. Category D includes mostly large, formal Fcctor employers.
17operating  costs  (excluding  depreciation)  incurred  by  beneficiaries.  Capital  costs  were
considered the responsibility  of the government and donors.
To calculate the each new year's premium,  the medical staff  (primarily  the Director of  the
CDI's  medical  service)  first  build  the  budget  for  the  new year,  based on  historical  costs
corrected for historical  inflation,  and incorporating estimates about the next year's inflation
rate, further  devaluation  of the zaire, and other budget parameters.  The staff  then divide the
estimated  operating  costs  by  the  total  population  to  obtain  the  per  capita  cost  of
hospitalization  for  the  next year.  Using various  assumptions  about  the  percentage  of  the
population  likely to enroll in the plan, and the expected revenue from uninsured  patients (who
would pay full charges), the zone calculates projected cost recovery for the hospital as a whole.
The premium for the health insurance plan is then set through discussions involving the whole
staff  and  incorporating  social  goals as well as cost recovery  objectives.  For  example, the
projected  premium  is compared  with  the price of two kilograms of  soy beans (a commonly
produced  crop), as a  measure of  affordability.  The  medical staff  tries  to  assure that  the
premium  is sufficiently  large to cover the claims of the beneficiaries,  with some margin  of
error.
Financial  records were not kept accurately  the first  year, although  the plan seemed to cover
costs.  Using Bitran's  data  (4), the cost per hospitalization  in  1985 vsas 3:6  Z.  (1,803,844 Z
total hospital operating  costs excluding depreciation  divided  by 5,711 hospitalizations.)  The
probability  of being hospitalized  in  1985 was 5% (5,711 hospitalizations  divided  by  114,410
inhabitants).  Therefore,  the expected cost of hospitalization  per inhabitanit was 15.8  Z (5% x
316).  The  premium  was  set  21% higher  than  the  expected  cost,  presumably  to  cover
administrative  costs, and  possible adverse selection.
The premium is collected once a year, at harvest time.  There are two harvest periods in the
Bwamanda zone; one in July-August, the other in January-February.  When communities were
asked when they would prefer to make the premium payment, they overwhelmingly preferred
the months following the second harvest period (March to April), because they needed cash in
August to pay for school expenses (14).
Collection of the premium takes place during  a six-to-eight week period in February  through
April.  Prior to this, several preparatory  meetings are held with health  center staff  to orient
them to any new changes in plan premiums and administrative  procedures, and to present them
with  the time table and control procedures for the registration  period.
Residents enroll  in the insurance  plan at their  health  center.  When the payment  is made, a
stamp printed  with the name of the health zone and the price  is affixed  on the individual's
medical  identity  card.  The  medical  card  includes  the  individual's  name,  village,  and
enrollment number, and allows space for critical  medical events to be registered (vaccinations,
prenatal  consultations,  hospitalizations,  etc.).  A second stamp, with  different  color print,  is
placed on the family  health  card, which stays at the health  center.  The health  center nurse
signs his/her  initials  over the stamp on the medical card, taking care that  the signature  also
touches the card, to avoid cases of fraud  where unsold stamps are stolen and affixed  to cards,
or stamps are moved from one person's card to another's.
The health  center  nurse also registers information  about each enrollee in special notebooks,
which  are organized  by village.  These notebooks are then used for  control  purposes at the
hospital level to control that  the bearer of an insurance  card is really the person named who
registered.
5  Annex IV provides  examples of many of the  documents described  below and  in  the
subsequent section on identification  of the uninsured.
18During  the enrollment  period, health  zone administrative  staff  make frequent  trips  to the
health  centers to collect the premiums, distribute  stamps, and monitor recford-keeping. Each
health  center  is visited  10 to  12 times during  this  6 to 8 week period.  An example of  the
control sheet for the sale of membership stamps is attached  in Annex IV.
According co Moens, the incremental  cost of administering  the program was 75,242 Z ($586)
in  1987, or 4.2% of the premiums collected (14).  This amount  does not  include  the cost of
salaries of health zone staff  who are involved in regular record-keeping and control activities
(verification  of membership of hospitalized patients), since no additional  staff  were hired to
work full-time  on administering  the insurance plan.  The authors  estimate that  the full cost
of plan administration  in  1989 (including  the cost of part-time  administrative  staff)  will be
632,015 Z. ($1,784), or 5.7%  of the premiums collected.
All cases which are seen at the hospital must either be referred  by a health  center or must pav
for a private  doctor visit not eligible for insurance coverage.  When an insured patient arrives
at  the  hospital,  he  presents  his  referral  slip.  The  referral  slip  indicates  the  insurance
membership number, which  is also the number accorded  the family  during  the nealth  zone
census.  If referred,  all patients  may see the doctor in this manner,  before paying any fees.
Since referral  is mandatory,  most cases warrant  hospitalization;  the doctor then  fills out  a
hospitalization  card  during  the  patient's  initial  encounter,  transcribing  the  insurance
membership number from the referral  slip.
The cashier's  office  then checks the patient's  insurance  number against  the  insurance  plan
membership register,  which was filled  out by the health  center  nurse during  the enrollment
process. As mentioned earlier, these notebooks are organized by village.  If the patient's  name
appears  in  the  insurance  membership  register,  the  patient  is charged  the  insured  (Payor
Category  B) price,  generally a 20 percent  co-payment.  If  the name does not appear  in  the
register,  then  the patient  pays one of  the other  prices, depending  on payor  category.  The
cashier  clerk  writes  a  receipt,  which is stapled  to the patient's  hospitalization  card.  Each
payor category  has a different  color or type of receipt.  A copy of the receipt rests with  the
clerk, who then transcribes the information  into the cashier's register, a chronological register
of all paying hospitalized  cases.
Three categories of patients  pay no fee when they receive care:  (I) women delivering  babies
who are  insured  and  received prenatal  care;  (2) trypanosomiasis  patients  who are covered
under a special donor program; and (3) school children  for whom an annual aggregate payment
is paid by the schools.
Premiums are deposited in a special fund  for the insurance plan, at the CDI. The health  zone
administrator  keeps the financial  records regarding deposits, withdrawals  and transfers  from
the fund.  Each month, the  hospital  bills the insurance  fund  for  the services provided  to
hospitalized  patients  who are insured.  The bill  is calculated  by multiplying  the number of
insured  patients  hospitalized  in  each  service  by  the  unit  charge  per  service,  minus  the
copayment.
The hospital  administrator  also records the amount of interest  which the fund  accumulates
each month.  Between 1987 and  1989, interest  rates paid by the CDI have ranged  from 2.5%
(1989) to 3% per month (1987 and  1988). Administrative  expenses (bonus payments to staff
during  enrollment period, transportation  expenses, enrollment register-books and stamps) are
also subtracted  from the fund, although the chart of accounts is not used to record the nature
of each expense.
At the start of the  1989 accounting year (April  1989), the insurance  fund  loaned the health
zone's pharmacy 7 million Zaires (69% of the fund's balance). In August, the pharmacy repaid
3 million Zaires to the insurance fund.  In lieu of interest, at the end of the year the pharmacy
19administrator  (a  Belgian  nurse)  will calculate  the  benefit  to  the  pharmacy  from  having
purchased drugs early  in  the year, before the Zaire  devaluated  further,  and  will remit this
amount  to the insurance  fund.
3.  Resource MAobilization
A principal objective in establishing  Bwamanda's insurance plan was to improve the financial
situation  of the reference  hospital.  Social goals were also incorporated  into the design of the
plan, notably the decisions to provide 100%  coverage of deliveries and to provide coverage of
chronic  illness treatment  at the health center level.  This section presents a financial  analysis
of the relevant policy questions:
o  Has the insurance plan helped the financial  condition  of the hospital?
o  What effect  has providing  coverage of chronic  illness care  had on the cost recovery
performance  of health  centers?
o  Is the insurance  plan financially  sound?  Do the premiums cover the cost of services
to beneficiaries,  plus administrative  costs?  How important  is revenue from  interest?
Table A.4 presents  the financial  statements for the insurance plan from  1987 through  1989.
The data show "hat in  1987  and  1988  the insurance plan covered  100%  of hospital charges for
health  care benefits  provided to beneficiaries,  and covered incremental  administrative  costs,
with positive margins. The plan is projected to cover hospital charges and administrative  costs
in  1989, as well.
Hospital charges are naturally  the largest expense category (89% in 1989). Charges for chronic
illness  cases  treated  at  the  health  center  level  account  for  6  to  7% of  expenses,  while
administrative  costs are 4 to 6%.
Table A.5 shows the financial  situation  of  the hospital  for  1985 to 1986 and  1988 to  1989.
(Data  for  1987 were  not  available).  The  table  shows that  cost  recovery  of  the  hospital
improved with the implementation  of the insurance plan between 1985 and 1988. In 1985, the
hospital covered approximately  48% of operating costs (excluding depreciation  and expatriate
salaries) with  user charges.  This figure jumped to 65% in 1986, and  79% in  1988.6
Using the inflation  rates in Annex III, real operating  revenue grew by 21% and real operating
expenses grew by 70% from  1985 to  1989, the period over which the insurance  program was
implemented.
In 1989, operating  revenue is projected to cover only 35% of operating  expenses.  This figure
is suspect, however, because of the complex accounting procedures and co-mingling of funds
within  the Bwamanda health zone. (The health zone only makes accrual and other adjustments
once a year, when preparing year-end financial  operating  statements.  These had not yet been
made and were not factored  in the projection).
The percentage  of total  expenses allocated  to salaries increased  from 41% in  1985 to 53% in
6 Depreciation  figures  are not available  for all years, and  so were not included  in Table
A.5.  In  1988, depreciation  expense was 415,000 Z (S2,219).  When depreciation  expense is
included,  cost recovery falls to 76%.
20Table A.4  FianciaL  Situation  of  Swambnda  Insurane  Plan,  1987-1989
Current Zaires,  with  adjustments (see note)
1987  1988  1989
................  .............  ....  ...  ,......  ....  .......
Current  X  of  Current  X  of  Current  X  of
Zaires  Expen. Zeires  Expen. Zaires  Expen.
REVENUE  v  ................  .................
Premiumi (urwdjusted)  1,785,060  4,023,100  10,177,250
Adjusted*  2,065,314  118.91  4,851,859  101.01  11,011,785  98.6X
Interest  460,692  26.5X  935,h75  19.51  710,596  6.41
ADJ.  PREh  & INTEREST:  2,526,006  145.41  5,787,614  120.51  11,722,381 104.9Z
EXPENSES
Hospital  care  1,671,500  96.21  4,226,055  88.01  9,915.491  88.8X
Health  center  care  0  0.01  346,250  7.21  622,582  5.61
................  ................  .................
Total  care:  1,671,500  96.21  4,572,305  95.2X 10,538,073  94.3X
Vehicle;  stationary  N/A  N/A  198,920  1.81
Staff  bona payments  N/A  N/A  338,295  3.01
Administrator  (101)  N/A  N/A  22,800  0.2X
Nembership  clerk  (50X)  N/A  N/A  72,00F  0.6X
...............-  ----------------  -----------------
Total  administration:  65,378  3.81  229,885  4.81  632,015  5.71
TOTAL  EXPENSES:  1,736.878  100.01  4,802,190  100.01  11,170,088  100.01
..............  ....................  ....
NOTES:
Erpeses and interest  in  1989  *re  *xtrapolated  from 5.5  months  of  data.
'  PremiLm  revenue  Is  received  in  a  Lump  su  early  in  the  year  (on  average  in  March),  while  expenses
are  evenly  distributed  throughout  the  year.  Thus  a  sLight  adjustment  is  needed  within  ench  year,  to
assure  comparability  of nominal  Zaires.  The  prmium revenue  has  been  infleted  by the  following




Exchange  rates  and  inflation  rates  for  each  year  are fourd  in  Annex  111.
l988.7 If expatriate  salaries were included,  the hospital's total operating  costs would rise by
8% (using salaries of Zairian  staff)  or 58% (using a conservative estimate of actual salaries).
The amount  spent on drugs rose from  31% in  1985 to 47% in  1986, then fell again to 30% in
1988.
Table  A.6 shows the financial  situation  of Bwamanda's health  centers  and  health  posts.  In
1988, the year the plan coverage went  into effect  at the health  center  level, health  centers
received  346,250 Z ($1,852) from the insurance plan for services provided  to members.  This
accounted  for 3.1% of their  total operating  revenue.  The health  centers  had a  14.2%  profit
7 The value of expatriate  salaries has not been included in the financial  statements because
data  are  not  available  from  all  years.  In  1989, the  hospital  benefitted  from  the  donated
services of five expatriate  volunteers: three nurses and two doctors.  Valued at the salaries of
equivalent  Zairian  staff,  this  subsidy  of  in-kind  services  is worth  4,020,000 Z  ($11,349),
accounting  for a 31% increase  in personnel expense, and  an 8% increase  in overall  hospital
operating expenses. With the value of expatriate  salaries included, personnel expense accounts
for  about 38% of total  expenses.
21margin  in 1988 (excluding depreciation).
'.able  A.5  Financial  Situation  of  Swoenda Hospital,  19"5-1986,  1988-1969
Nominal Zafres
198s  1986  1988  1989
......................  *^s  ^Zzes  ooovo*  **  ......................  .................  . . ......................  w*  * 
Nominal Z.  X  of  Expen  Nominal Z.  X  of  Expen  Nominal Z.  X  of  Expen  Nominal  Exp.  Rev.
OPERATING  REVENUE  ---  - -........-------.-  .....-.---.--  .---  .-  .-.-
User  fees  N/A  N/A  873,652  29.8s  2,267,eo8  24.02  3,960,089  12.92
Employer  bllitng  N/A  N/A  394,353  13.4X  2,045,425  21.6X  714,750  2.3X
Insurance  plen  0  0  650,900  22.22  3,120,905  33.0X  5,204,045  17.02
Other  N/A  N/A  0  30,600  0.3X  743,925  2.4X
..........  ......  ..........  ......  .........  ......  ...........  ......
TOTAL:  878,583  48.72  1,918,905  65.42  7,464,730  78.9s  10,622,809  34.72
OPERATING  EXPENSES
Persomel  (excl.  expats)  739,207  41.02  1,007,462  34.3X  5,036,307  53.2x  9,082,368  29.7x
Drugs  and  med.  supplies 563,607  31.22  1,337,286  47.32  2,830,552  29.92 1S,272,868  49.92
Office  sI.plies  75,515  4.22  40,093  1.42  204,086  2.22  526,853  1.72
Transport  84,729  4.7X  0  0.02  0  0.02  2,003,736  6.52
Maintenance  176,947  9.82  146,678  5.02  499,619  5.32  1,431,446  4.7X
Fuel  & electricity  163,839  9.12  276,101  9.42  676,749  7.22  131,813  0.42
Food  service  & other  0  0.02  76,795  2.6X  212,687  2.22  2,174,505  7.12
.........  ......  .........  ......  .........  .......  .........  ...
TOTAL:  1,803,844  100.02  2,934,415  1fl'2.O  9,460,000  100.02  30,623,588  100.02
OPERATING  SUBSIDIES:  925,261  51.32  11015.510  34.62  1,995,270  21.1X 20,000,779  65.32
NOTE: 1989 figures  are extrapolated  frm  8 months  of  data.
Table A.6  Financiat  Situation  of  Health Centors in  S_amenda,  1985-1986,  1988-1989
Nominal Zaires
1965  1986  1988  1989
Nominal  2. X  of  Expen. Nominal Z.  X of  Expen. Nominal Z.  2 of  Expen.  X  of  Expen.
PERATING  REVENUE  --------------  ..  ..
User fees  1,312,131  106.52 2,283,794  109.22 12,393,789  111.1  19,231,628  92.52
surance plan  0  0.02  0  0.02  346,250  3.1%  993,873  4.82
TOTAL:  1,312,131  106.52 2,283,794  109.2x 12,740.039  114.22  20,225,501  97.22
PERATING  EXPENSES
Personrwel  (excl.expets.)  476,244  38.6x  649,670  31.1X  2,93,758  26.72  6,537,590  31.42
Drugs and med.  4uplIes  521,298  42.32  1,197,702  57.32  6,899,327  61.82  10,932,372  S2.62
Office  supplies/mint.  126,405  10.32  243,342  11.6"  1,283,712  11.52  1.888,631  9.12
supervision  fe  1t08,600  8.82  0  0.02  0  0.02  1,040,469  5.02
Hosp. prenatal services  0  0.02  0  0.02  0  0.02  402,442  1.92
TOTAL:  1,232,547  100.0o  2,090,714  100.02  11.156,797  100.02  20,801,503  100.02
'ROFIT (DEFICIT):  79,s54  6.s5  193,080  9.22  1,583,242  14.2X  (576,003)  -2.82
NOTES: 1989 figures  are  extrapolated  frm  8 months  of  data.
Cost recovery in Bwamanda's health centers was high even before the plan went  into effect:
in 1985, the health centers had a profit  margin of 6.5 percent, excluding depreciation.  In 1986,
22cost recovery was even better, with a 9.2% profit margin, although the financial  records show
that  the zone did  not charge the health  centers for supervision costs in  1986 and  1988.
Hospital costs in  the Bwamanda health  zone are similar  to those of other  well functioning
zones.  Of the eight zones for which Bitran et al compiled per capita  hospital expenditures
in  1985, Bwamanda ranked  third lowest (4). It3 per capita cost was $0.42 (21 Z) compared to
the eight-zone average of $0.65  (32 Z).
4.  Utilization  and  Access to Services
Theories of insurance suggest that insured persons may use more services than uninsured  due
to both adverse selection (the tendency  of persons more likely  to need services to purchase
insurance)  and  moral hazard  (the tendency  of persons to be more prolifigate  in demanding
services when they face few financial  penalties).  These phenomena make the development of
insurance  more difficult  because they raise premiums, further  discouraging  health, low cost
people  from  buying  insurance.  The  authors  examined  whether  these  theories  applied  to
Bwamanda and confirmed  that  they did.
The authors'  analysis of utilization data showed that distance and membership status strongly
affect  hospital  utilization.  Hospitalization  rates are higher  for members and  workers with
employer-provided  health  care coverage than for Bwamanda residents  who have no form of
health  insurance  or employer coverage.  The authors  examined this pattern  with  two sets of
data:  monthly  utilization  statistics  tabulated  by each service, and  a ten percent  sample of
entries  from the hospital register  for all admissions.
Table A.7 compares the insurance status of hospitalized patients  with the insurance status of
Zaire's  population.  While 77% of  the  patients  are  insured,  only  60% of  the  health  zone
population are members of the insurance plan.  Persons covered by an employer are even more
overrepresented  among the  patients  than  in  the  population.  There  are  three  times  more
employed persons, and  only a third  as many uninsured  patients  hospitalized  than  expected
from their frequency  in the population.
Table  A.7  Distribution  of  Payment Categories  in  the  Population
wnd  Hospital  Patients,  Dec.1988  - Oct.1989
(maternity  patients  exctuded)
POPULATION  HOSPITAL  PATIENTS
PAYMENT  FROM  ZONE*
CATEGORY  PERSONS  X  SAMPLE  X
Eaployed  6,176  4.61  54  17.3X
Insured  81,142  60.2X  240  76.7X
Total  not Insured  47,362  35.2X  19  6.1X
TOTAL  134,680 100.0l  313  100.01
*  Th.  original  smple of  329 patients  Included  16(4.9X)  from  outside  of
Bwmwds  zone.  They  were  removed  fro  the  onot  insuredO  category,  Leaving
the  313  petients  reported  here.
8  These were derived  by dividing  the total  expenditures  for  hospitals in the zone by
the zone's population.  This calculation  does not adjust for  net border crossing.
23The systematic one in ten sample of patients  from  the admissions register  covered patients
admitted  from December 1988 through  October 1989. Data were analyzed according  to four
major service categories:  pediatrics, internal  medicine, gynecology and surgery.  Obstetrical
patients  were excluded  because of incomplete records.
Based on the hospital register, Table A.8 shows that the annual hospitalization  rate was 10.5%
for  salaried  workers  and  family  members with  employer-paid  health  coverage; 3.6% for
members  of  the  Bwamanda  insurance  plan;  and  0.5% for  Bwamanda  residents  without
insurance or employer coverage.
Table  A.8  1989 Acdmission Rates  by  Payment Category
----- Payment  Category-----  Over-
Not  TOTAL  all
Service  Insured  Insured  Employed  ZONE Total
(Population)  47,362  81,142  6,176 134,680  n.a.**
Arnual  Admissions:*
Surgery  166  547  71  788  840
Gynecology  29  132  26  276  283
ALL (Exc.Obs.)  231  2,640  594  3,465 3,330
Arv.uAl  Admission  Rates X):
Surgery  0.35X  0.67X  1.15X  0.59X
Gynecology  0.06X  0.16X  0.43X  0.20C
ALL (Exc.Obs.)  0.49X  3.25X  9.62X  2.57X
Risk  Ratios  for  Admissions:
Surgery  1.0  1.9  3.3  1.7
Gynecology  1.0  2.7  7.0  3.4
ALL  (Exc.Obs.)  1.0  6.7  19.7  5.3
..  ....  ....  ..  ....  ......  ............  .......  .....
NOTES:
* Mutbers  of surgery  and  gynecology  adtissions  were  extrapolated  from  complete  utilization
statistics  from  January  through  June,  1989 by  doublIng  the  six-month  total.  Numbers  of  arusal
ecmissions  for  all services  (excluding  obstetrics)  were  extrapolated  from  a 10X  satpte  of  such
admissions  from  December  1988  through  October  1989  by multiplying  the  total  by 12/11. The
extrapotations  were  based  on  657  wurgical  a*dissions,  230  gynecology  wdnissions,  nd 329  total
non-obstetricat  admissions,  respectivety.
*  Overalt  a*Issions lnctude  admisslons  of  patients  from  outsid,  of the  Swawand hea'th  zone.
The risk ratio  for  a payment  category  is the ratio  of  the admission rate  for  that  category
relative to the rate for uninsured  persons. The risk ratios across these services show consistent
patterns.  Insured patients  had from  1.9  to 6.7 times the admission rates of uninsured  patients.
Employed  patients  had  dramatically  higher  admission  rates:  3.3 to  19.7 times  those  of
uninsured  patients.
This  pattern  of  higher  rates  for  insured  and  employed persons, compared  to uninsured,  is
probably the combined effect  of moral hazard, some adverse selection, better  access, (closer
residents were more likely  to be insured) lack of adequate  controls (which  may permit  non-
members to falsely present themselves at the hospital as members) and random variation  due
to small numbers. Table A9, based on the survey, provides further  support of adverse selection
and/or  moral hazard.
24Table  A.9 Survey  of  HospitaLized  Patients  in  Bwamanda
. ..............................................  ...........  .....................  ...........................
Insured  Uninsured
(N229)  (M221)  Stat.
Characteristic  Mean  STO  Mean  STD Sig.
...........................................  ..............................................................  ..............
Age  in  years  20  19  22  20
Payment  for  current  hospitalization
in  Zaire  1568 1700  4083  4070  -
Number  of  episodes  of  serious  ilLness  2.4  2.9  1.6 1.2
In  househoid during  1988  and 1989
Nutber  of  hospitalization  episodes
in.househotd during  1988 and 1989  2.6  4.4  1.7  1.2
Nuiber of  times the  patient  was
hospitalized  from 1985 thru  1989  2.8  2.7  1.3  1.8  -
Number  of  persons in  househoLd:
Children  5.5  6.7  5.6  3.1
Younger  aduLts  3.8  3.5  2.7  1.2
Elders  0.7  1.1  0.6  0.7
TOTAL  10.0  8.4  8.9  3.3
For employed persons, both the hospital and the patient  have every incentive  to hospitalize.
Care is free  to the employee, and  the hospital  is paid  two to three  times the fee of a self-
paying patient.  The problem of higher hospital use by insured patients  has not had a serious
effect  on the  financial  solvency of the  insurance  plan, since the plan covers such a  large
percentage of the population  (60%). With lower enrollment, such a problem could bankrupt
an insurance system. The fact that insured patients use only a third to a half as much hospital
care as employed persons suggests that  the 20% copayment may have limited moral hazard.
Principles  of medical geography suggest that  people will consume more health  services the
nearer  they live to the site of care.  By examining the pattern,  one can see whether  the data
on utilization  rates are plausible.  Further,  by examining utilization  for  both distance  and
insurance status, simultaneous possible confounding between these variables can be eliminated.
The figure  shows that  insured  patients  used more services, regardless of distance.  A similar
pattern  held for internal  medicine admissions (one third  of all admissions), separately.
Overall hospital admission rates for all services (excluding obstetrics) were also examined by
distance  for  1989. Figure  A.2 shows the regression of admissions for all payment categories
and admissions with insurance  coverage on distance  from  the hospital.  The 21 observations
are villages covered by Bwamanda Hospital.
There was no evidence of any meaningful difference  in delay between insured and uninsured
patients.  A patient going to Bwamanda Hospital knows that he must pay on or near admission.
As an uninsured  patient  faces higher fees, it may take him longer to assemble the necessary
cash.  Using data  from  Kombo, Bombisa, and  Dondeme Health Centers,  the authors  found
minimal delay among both insured  and uninsured  patients  in both groups.
In previous work, Moens had examined whether patients  actually  followed up on referrals  to
the hospital.  He found  that rates were high and comparable for both insured  and  uninsured
patients.
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Figure  A.2
The study  team examined a  number of other  indicators  of quality  for  differences  between
iniured  and uninsured  persons:
- Proportion  of high risk pregnancies  delivered in hospital
- Proportion  of all deliveries in hospitals
- Age adjusted  overall death rate overall
- Childhood death  rate
Proportion  of pregnant women enrolled in ante-natal  care
- Birth rate
- Length of hospital stay.
- Delay in starting  delivery.
The study team tested most of these indicators  with a visit to Isabe health  center,  one of the
health  centers served by Bwamanda Hospital.  In theory, the data  to calculate  most of these
indicators  should  have been available  at the  health  center  through  the  family  registration
cards; the remaining  data  should have been available  at the hospital.  In practice,  the data
proved  inadequate  because family  cards  did  not necessarily  record every birth  and  death,
particularly  if  they occurred  at home or in the hospital.  For example the Isable household
cards in Isable showed 876 people. The cards reported only 21 births  (about half the expected
number) and  8 deaths (also fewer  than expected).
Table A.10 presents comments of insured and uninsured  patients  towards possible changes in
26insurance.  Members (n-29) indicated  their benefits and disadvantages.  Non-members (n-21)
indicated  why they did not join.  Members were interested in seeing ambulatory  care covered
at a  modest increase  in premium.  Those not joining  had  diverse reasons, including  living
outside the catchment  area.
Table  A.10 Swamwda  Survey:  Attitudes
.....  .............  ...........................................
No.  of
Survey  question  X  Respond.
Can  you  increase  your  premium  from  125  26
to  200  Zaire  to  cover  nmbulatory  care?
Yes  80.8X
No  19.2Z
why  did  you  decide  to  be  a  meber?
Cheapest  way to  get  care  89.72  29
Quality  of  care  is  better  3.4X
solidarity  3.4X
I  thought  it  was  oblieatory  3.42
Other  3.4X
What  benefits  do you receive  from your
membership?
The personnel sees me  faster  37.0X  27
I  have  better  health  3.72
i  want to  support  the  institution  3.72
Quality  of  care  is  better  22.22
Other  3.7X
No response  29.6X
What  are  the disadvantages or problem  of
insurance scheme?
Too  expensive  6.9X  29
It  is  necessary  to  come  for  ftollow  up  17.2X
visits
No  response  75.92
Why  are  you  not  a  member  of  the  insurance  scheme?
I  have no  money  16.02  21
I  didn't  know  at  the  time  of  5.02
Other  75.0O
27B.  CASE STUDY OF BOKORO
The rural health zone of Bokoro, located in the Bandundu region of Zaire about 350 km north-
east of Kinshasa, was created in  1981.  Services at health centers and hospitals are coordinated
by a central  office  (Bureau Central  de la Zone de Sante, BCZS). The various  organizations
which  provide  health  care  in  the zone are represented  in the  zone health  committee:  the
government, the Catholic and Baptist missions, the Belgian Cooperation, etc. The zone recovers
a substantial  part (over 80% in 1988)  of its recurrent  costs including local salaries through  fees
for  services.  Certain  services receive technical  and  financial  assistance  from a  variety  of
sources to close the gap between the available budget and expenditures. The referral  hospital
Bokoro recovers over 60% of its costs through  fees for services.
In contrast  to the Bwamanda health  zone, the referral  hospital  in Bokoro does not enjoy a
monopoly position.  It  faces several officially  recognized and  some 'illegal" competitors  for
inpatient  care. The hospital has made considerable efforts  since its creation to improve access
to ambulatory  inpatient  care all  over the zone. As a result, occupancy  rates  in  the Bokoro
hospital  have decreased drastically  since the late  1970's. When the rate stabilized  in  1987 at
about  1200 admissions per year excluding  the maternity,  it was about half  the level of  1978.
The number of available  hospital  beds decreased simultaneously,  from  127 in  1986 to 78 in
1989, resulting  in  an annual  occupancy rate  of 40% to 45%.  The average  length  of  stay  is
about  10 days.
In  addition  to  the  inpatient  care,  the  hospital  provides  ambulatory  care  to  1,500 to 2,000
patients  every year amounting  to about 5% of its annual operating  expenses in  1988.
1.  Terms of the Insurance  Plan
The Bokoro subscription  plan is a direct  insurance plan, offered  by the provider,  the Bokoro
Rural Health Zone. Since its introduction  in 1985  the insurance plan, called the "abonnement,"
has  undergone  dramatic  changes.  Originally  intended  to  guarantee  comprehensive  care,
including preventive, ambulatory and inpatient care at the peripheral and referral  level, today
this plan covers only curative  ambulatory  care.  Due to financial  difficulties,  extra  charges
are  imposed for  chronic  diseases  like  diabetes  and  hypertension.  Preventive  care,  family
planning,  deliveries,  prolonged treatment,  treatment  of  sexually  transmitted  diseases  and
antibiotics  and injections are not included  in the insurance plan;  patients  must pay for these.
First line treatments of tuberculosis and leprosy are provided free of charge through separate
programs.
Table B.l shows the full charge schedule at the health center.  Insured patients  pay 25 percent
of these charges; uninsured  patients  pay the full amount.  There  is no cap on spending.  As
virtually all enrollees are employees, any cap would be inconsistent with the Zaire employment
laws, which require  employers to pay for all medical care.
Most employers in the zone, including  health services, missions, and processors of agricultural
products  (such as BIMPE) enrolled  their  workers and dependents  in this plan. Presently over
4,000 persons are covered, representing  4.5% of the Bokoro Health  Zone.  Enrollment  in the
.nsurance  plan (abonnement")  costs 1,200 Z per person per year.  When one family  member
enrolls, the entire  family is obliged to subscribe.  This requirement  reduces the likelihood of
an adverse selection as well as sharing one card among family members. Contributions  for an
entire  family  can easily  reach  12,000 Z. This  premium  is very  expensive  for  the  general
population;  thus, the enrollment rate outside of employees is presently  close to nil.
No co-payment was associated  with  the plan initially.  To reduce the moral hazard  patients
must now make a 25% co-payment of the normal non-subscriber  fees. Because only employees
are enrolled and  they should be reimbursed for this copayment, this policy should not affect
28Table  8.1  Fees for  Service  at  Health  Centers
Bokoro  Health  Zone,  1989
.............................................
SERVICE  CATEGORY  IZAIRES
.....................................  ................................  .
CONSLILTATIONS 
Children,  registered  at  NCH  120
Children,  not  registered  150
Patient  above  14  years  180
Patient  from  outside  zone  250
MATERNAL  and CHILC HEALTH
Pre-school  care
inct.  immdization  (5  yrs.)  200
Ante  natal  care  (9  months *)  200
Planrnd  parenthood  (12  months)  300
F)  for  one disease  episode  up to  5 days  duration.
Extra  charges  apply  for:  antibiotics,  drugs  after
the  fifth  day,  fee  for  after  hour  consultations.
')  Excluded:  weekly  malari  prevention.
utilization  substantially.  From the survey, it was not clear whether insured  respondents were
actually  reimbursed  for all medical costs.
Services are fully  available  to uninsured  persons upon payment  of a flat  fee for  an episode
of care.  A minimum charge was set at 180 Z for an adult in 1988 by the BCZS. However, the
health  committee for a health  center can decide to charge more, for example 500 Z. Services
covered by the flat  rate are limited.  Extra  charges arise for  antibiotics,  prenatal  and  child
care.
To better  characterize  the insured  and  uninsured  population  and  to assess interest  in other
forms of insurance, a small survey was conducted.  The questionnaire  was similar, though not
identical,  to the one used in Bwamanda, discussed above.  The questionnaire  was written  in
Lingala.  Annex V contains  a copy of a completed questionnaire  in Lingala and an  English
translation.  Of the 47 subjects interviewed, 21 were a systematic one-third  sample of the 63
non-maternity  inpatients  in Bokoro Hospital, and 26 were heads of families (all farmers  and
fishermen)  from  the towns of Bokoro and  Kempa, 12 km outside Bokoro.  These 26 families
were chosen systematically  from  family  cards  in the health  centers  of Bokoro and  Kempa.
Table  B.2 characterizes  the insured and  uninsured  respondents.
Table  5.2  Bokoro  Survey:  Population  Characteristics.
Insured  Unirnsured  Valid
Characteristic  (Nu21)  WMZ6)  Responses
.........  .......................................
Gender:
Fm_  le  29X  46X  47
Male  11  S4X
Average Age  35  32  47
SDO  f Age  14  20
29*Patients  from:  47
Sokoro  Hospital  38J  50X  21
lokoro  Town  33X  23X  13
Keop  Toin  29X  272  13
Receives  a slary each  month  19X  8X  47
Occupation:  47
Agricutture/CuLtivation  572  65X
Fishing  102  82
Teacher  14X  02
Driver  02  4X
ELptoyed  (details  unspecified)  5  8X
Trader  102  42
No occupation  or  no  response  52  122
Eptpoyer:  47
Pere-stataL  enterprise  52  OX
None or  no  response  952  1002
Would  you  be  able  to  pay  in  cash  10,000  Zaires  47
for  an  illness  requiring  minor  surgery
in  a  hospitaL?
Ues  192  4X
No  762  e8l
No response  5S  8J
,...........................................................  .........................
*  Percentage  of  respondents  from  each  source  Insured:  Bokoro  HospitaL,  382;  Sokoro  town,  542;  Keqsa  tow,
462.
2.  Organization  and Management
Three major concerns led to the introduction  of an insurance plan in 1985 by the health  zone
authorities:  a) the financial  accessibility  to health  care was too limited  for  the majority  of
the population  of the zone; b) a referral  to the hospital  was a severe financial  burden; and
c) revenues were not able to cover most recurrent  costs.
The level of the premium is based on historic utilization  rates, an average length of an episode
and  the quantity  of drugs  and  materials  consumed.  The utilization  pattern  of a  group of
private  employees (BIMPE corporation)  was initially  used as a standard.  The premium was set
to 600 Z in  1985 and remained constant until  April  1989.  In that month, the rate was doubled
to 1,200 Z.  Actual utilization  in 1989  was found to be two consultations  per member per year
and the average  cost was 500 Z per consultation.
In  April  1989, the  annual  premium  was doubled  to  1200 Z.  The  increase  anticipated
continuing  inflation  (which  sometime exceeded  100%  per  year),  and a possible increase  in
utilization.
Insurance premia are paid to the provider, the health center.  Premia for employed persons and
their  dependents are paid by the employer. In theory, people could enroll at any time during
the year. In practice, enrollment tended to be highest after the two harvest and fishing seasons
in  this area, January,  July and August, when the agribusinesses  had the most cash and were
best able to pay the annual  premia for employees.
The names of all insured  family members are recorded on duplicate  forms.  One copy remains
at the health  center and  the other with  the family.  No unique identification  numbers were
used for each subscriber.  The study team found  no controls that would prevent  non-enrolled
persons from  borrowing an insured person's enrollment form. It was not possible to assess the
extent  to  which  free  care  was  provided  to  unregistered  persons  or  persons  where  the
30membership had expired.
Although the Bokoro subscription plan does not cover inpatient  care, it indirectly  pays for the
initial  hospital consultation.  Prior  to admission the patient  pays a consultation  fee for  the
physician  visit. About two thirds  of the outpatients  are referred  by the health centers.  For
each  referred  outpatient,  the  hospital  charges  the  referring  health  center  300 Z,  thereby
generating  about 300,000 Z.  Rcferred  patients  themselves pay nothing for this consultation,
but  they do pay regular  hospitalization  charges if they are admitted.  Self-referred  patients
pay 500 Z for their  outpatient  consultation.
The system of  referral  accounts for health  centers was introduced  in  1985. These accounts
were  intended  to  pay  for  hospital  care  of  patients  referred  from  the  health  center  for
continued  treatment  of  the same illness  episode. Due  to  limited  revenues,  however,  only
outpatient  consultations at the hospital are included today. Fifty  percent of the health centers'
profit  (the balance of revenues after  deduction  of recurrent  expenses and costs of drugs) is
credited  every month to the referral  account.
This system of referral  accounts, similar to one used in the town of Kasongo, was intended  to
provide a form of risk pooling. Minor outpatient  episodes would have subsidized more costly
problems requiring  hospitalization.  Kasongo reportedly  has had similar problems to Bokoro,
however.  At the level of flat fees for outpatient  care that are acceptable, it is not possible to
generate sufficient  revenues to finance  inpatient  care.
All revenues after  deduction of local exoenses are transferred  monthly to the central account
of  the  health  zone at  the  Service  a'  Approvisionnement  en  Fournitures,  Equipements  et
Medicaments (SAFEM), which keeps separate  accounts for the hospital, zone, and pharmacy.
At  the  BCZS each  health  center  has  its  own account  showing debits  and  credits.  Funds
generated by the insurance plan are not separated from other revenues. As a result, it was nut
be possible to estimate  the administrative  effort  for  the plan separately.
3.  Resource Mobilization
The health  zone as a whole operated at a deficit  each year from  1986 through  1989. In 1988,
the deficit  was 2 million Z.  The majority of  health  centers either  have deficits  or generate
insufficient  profits  to  cover  the  administrative  costs  of  the  BCZS. There  is  a  severe
disincentive  for  these health  centers to  function  well.  If  they make a profit,  only  15% is
retained  for  investments  and  only  10% for  discretionary  use  by  the  health  committee.
Moreover, there is no punishment  for  bad performance; rather  the good centers  will have to
share  the entire  burden.
Preserving premium income over the year is a problem throughout Zaire.  Savings kept in cash
is eroded by inflation,  and  bank  interest  rates are generally far  below inflation.  The study
team  identified  several institutions  in which revenues from the health insurance  plan could
be invested.  Last year a rural savings cooperative, Societe Cooperative d'Epargne  et de Credit
de Bokoro (SECREB) was created by private citizens. A very competitive interest  rate will be
paid  this  year  for  short  term (several  months) deposits.  An alternative  is several  private
merchants  who supply farmers  with tools and material  and who buy their  products. Several
of them are seen by long time Bokoro residents as serious partners  for  investments.
Before examining the financial  status of Bokoro hospital, its charge structure  will be reviewed.
An advance of 2,500 Z has to be paid on admission. This amount covers an anticipated  period
of  hospitalization  of  10 days; the minimum charge  is for  five  days (1250 Z).  Any unused
balance is refunded  to the patient.  In addition  the patient  pays for  various  procedures and
for  certain  drugs.  Table  B.3 shows a  detailed  price  list  for  services  provided  at  Bokoro
Hospital.
31Table 9.3  Fees for  Service at  Bokoro Hospital,  1989
SERVICE  CATEGORY  I  ZAIRES SERVICE  CATEGORY  I  ZAIRES
AMBULATORY  CARE  INPATIENT  CARE
Consultation,  referred  300  Deposit  2,500
Cons. non-referred  500  Niniam  Payment  1,250
Cons. nurse  on duty  200  Any additional  day  250
Outpatient  care * 1  week  500
Diabetes  (6 months)  250  Private  room  per day,  standard  500
Private  consultation  1,000  Private  room  per day,  Luxury  650
Nedical  certificate  500  Laboratory,  cat.  4  250
Surgery,  cat.  1  2,100
Laboratory,  cat.  1  50  Surgor),  cat.  2  3,150
Laboratory,  cat.  2  100  Surgery,  cat.  3  4,050
Laboratory,  cat.  3  150  Surgery,  cat.  4  4,850
Laboratory,  cat.  4  250  Surgery,  cat.  5  7,200
Surgery,  cat.  6  8,650
X-Ray  1,000  Spinal  anesthesia  A50
Ultrasound,  extern,  w/  med.need  1,000  Ultrasound  500
Ulttasound,  extern,  on  demnd  2,000  X-Ray  1,000
Echocardiogram  350
Surgery,  cat.  1  1,250
Eye  examination  250
.............................  ......................................  .....  e....
Table  S.4  Firnncial  Situation  of  Bokoro  Hospital,  1986  - 1989
Percent  Percent  Percent  I  Percent
of  total  of  total  t  of  total  I  1.HALF  of  total
1986  exenses  1987 *  ees  1988  exeses  I M989  expenses
-------------  ------..  -----  ------------------ 1-  ---------------------- 1-----------------------
Exp.  Rev.  |Exp.  Rev.  | Exp. Rev.  Exp. Rev.
OPEiRATING  REVENUE
User fees and  I  I  I  I  I  I  I
insurance  plan  2,218,013  91.7X13,189,941  1  99.3115,220,314  1  96.91I4,147,044  1  98.3X
Others  201,598  i  8.3X1  21,398  |  0.7%1  164,501 i  3.1X1  71,782  |  1.7X
------.--- I  ...  ..  .----------  ---  .. I  -----  1--I-----  ---  --
TOTAL:  2,419,611  |  96.7813,211,339  56.3X15,384,815  16.3X14,218,826  |  62.1X
OPERATING  EXPENSES  I  I  I  I  I  I
Persorrel  (excl.expats)  846,222  I 49.61  12,049,358  I 52.81  12,768,706  46.4%  12,932,384  1 44.5X
Drugs  and med.supplies  404,718  23.71X,  990,890  1 25.51  12,322,755  I 38.9X  12,834,017  1 43.01
Office  siplies  16,220  1.01  I  29,483  I  0.8X  39,113 I  0.71  I 78,296  I  1.2X
Tranrport  610  |  0.0%  %  96,548  |  2.51  |  141,861  |  2.41  |  31,334  |  0.5X
Maintenance  61,403  3.61  I  105,648  2.7S  126,212  2.1X  I  127,772  1.9X
Fuel  £ electricity  216,910  12,71  I  4,757  11.5X  429,037  7.2x  55S,316  I  8.4X
Food service  & other  159,499  |  9.41  |  166,234|  4.2  |  140,943  2.4X  |  34,282  |  0.51
.---.-  ------  1  .------- 1-  -----  --.-.-.--  - ----------  -----
TOTAL:  1,705,582 |lOO.0  13.8a0.918  |100.01  O5,968,627  1100.01  16,593,401 1100.0|
OPERATING  SUBSIDIES:  33,099  |  1.3112,497,14  1  43.7X12,742,143  |  33.7112,574,322  |  37.91
I  ---  1  1  ----  1  --- I  ...
100.0O1  I  100.0O1  I  100.0X1  I  100.0l
32Table  B.4 shows the cash flow of Bokoro Hospital from  1986 through  the first  six months of
1989. Revenues from operations  together with subsidies cover hospital expenses every year.
While in  1986 almost  99% of  operating  expenses came from  operating  revenues,  this share
dropped to 56% the following year.  In 1988  and  1989, respectively, 34% and 38%  of operating
expenses are covered from subsidies. The Catholic mission, the Belgian Cooperation, SANRU,
FONAMES, and the government of Zaire contributes  salaries for some of the personnel.
The share of expenses for drugs and medical supplies has doubled over the past four years and
is approaching  50% of the hospital's recurrent  costs.
It was not possible to distinguish  between revenues from  insurance funds  and direct  patient
charges.  The hospital budget is shown to cnable a calculation  of necessary revenues from  a
hypothetical  insurance  for hospital care. Given the present subsidies and the present level of
services the  hospital  would  need a  minimum of 40,000 subscribers.  Including  anticipated
administrative  costs for the insurance  plan and an inflation  rate of 60%, a premium of  200
Z per person would seem necessary.
4.  Utilization  and Access
Rates of utilization  of ambulatory care services at the Bokoro Health Center for the first  six
months in 1989 are shown in Table B.5. D.fferences in utilization  between subscribers and the
uninsured  are striking.  Based on the six months  average, subscribers  consult five  times as
often  as non-subscribers  with a new disease.  Rates of treatment  with  antibiotics,  antibiotic
prescriptions, and injections show a similar pattern.  Subscribers use two to nine times as many
services. Their higher utilization rate is not necessarily due to insurance, however. Every plan
subscriber  is employed and all medical expenses for the family  are covered anyway.
In the household survey, mentioned earlier, respondents  were asked about  their  preferences
regarding  health  insurance.  A single annual  payment of 100 Z to 200 Z per family  member
seemed affordable.  The preferred  times to pay were January,  July, and August.  The survey
of members showed that they were interested in broader coverage that would include hospital
care as well as ambulatory care (see Table B.6). While hospitalized patients naturally  preferred
hospital care, a majority of healthy  villagers preferred  ambulatory care.
A major handicap  to wider  enrollment  is probably the lack of  an  incentive  for  the health
personnel to attract  new subscribers. The staff  of health  centers are evaluated  and rewarded
with an incentive  payment for an overall high utilization  rate, correct operational  procedures
and  having more revenues than expenses.  No incentive  is provided for new plan subscribers.
These would merely add to the work load but not necessarily  increase the profit.
Health  zone administrators  complained that  clinical  personnel did  not believe in the value
of the insurance  scheme. Thus, their  publicity and educational  efforts  were minimal or even
negative.  No clear policy had been formulated  regarding the best enrollment  period.
The authors  felt that  if the premium were lower, substantially  more subscribers would enroll
and would dilute  the present high risk membership with more low risk subscribers. The health
committee members and health center staff  with whom they spoke, however, could not follow
t;.is argument.
The study team felt that respected community institutions  could assist in publicizing the idea
of a prepayment plan.  In Bokoro, the Programme des Actions Complementaires (PAC) might
serve this role.  It was created  to promote social services, agricultural  and  fishing  activities
and  4%  associated  with  the  BCZS.  Also, two religious  missions (Catholic and  Baptist)  have
contributed  greatly  to the development of the Bokoro area over the past 70 years. They enjoy
great  confidence  of  the  population  which  could  be an  important  factor  for  a  successful
33Table 6.5  Health Care Utilization  by  'lan Subscribers  nd Non-subscribers at  Bokoro Health Center *
I  1989  Jan  Feb  Par  Apr  May  Jun  |  AVERAGE  RAThO#I
lPopulatfon  sze  I
Non-subscribers  3817  3797  3794  3819  3799  2966 |  3669 |
Subscribers  I 156  176  179  174  174  176  173
Totat  3973  3973  3973  3993  3973  3162 I  3841
-----------  -----------------  ---  ----  --  ------  ---------  -- 1------1  - -----
|  | ANNUAL  UTILIZATION  RATE.
Now  cases
Non-subscribers  I  0.45  0.38  0.46  0.48  0.46  0.59  0.47
Subscribers  4.59  1.69  1.86  2.25  1.79  2.30  I  2.36 I  5.0
tAntibiotic  prescr.18 
Non-subscribers  1  0.03  0.05  0.05  0.08  0.07  0.06  0.06
Subscribers  1 0.49  0.31  0.27  0.31  0.49  0.72  0.44 I 7.3
linjections  I
I  Non-subscribers  I  0.14  0.08  0.15  0.32  0.33  0.19  |  0.20  |
Subscribers  I  1.98  0.92  0.27  1.24  1.51  3.11  I  1.72  8  8.6
AVERAGE  RATE  PER  NEW  CASE
fAntibiotic  Rx  I
Non-subscribers I  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.09  0.09  0.10  |  0.07
Subscribers  0.11  0.18  0.14  0.14  0.20  0.31  j  0.18 I  2.61
lInjections  I  I  I 
I Non-subscribers  I  0.32  0.21  0.31  0.66  0.70  0.33 I  0.42 I  I
Subscribers  0.43  0.55  0.62  0.55  0.84  1.35 !  0.73 !  1.7
*)  Data from  the  *BORDEREAU  DE  CONTROLE  DE CAISSEn  pert  A,  Nber  14 - 16 wnd  19.
?)  Ratio  of  average for  subscribers  divided  by average  for  non-subscribers.
*)  Projected  annual  utiLization  rates,  calcuLated  as:
nimber of  services  in  month  *  12 /  population  size.
insurance  plan.
Table B.6  Sokoro Survey:  Ouestions Asked Separately
of  Insured Respondents  (N=21)
QUESTIONS  Respondents
Can  you pay 100 Zeares for  an in  urance scheme  21
which  wfil  take care  of  all  of  your  fmily?  Wien?
Now  52X
In  a week  19X
In a month  10X
kewer  19X
Can  you pay 200 Zaires  for  an Insurance  scheme  _ich
wIll  take  care  of  all  of  your  fteily?  21
Now  38X
In one day  5X
In  a  week  10X
In  a month  29X
Never or  no response  19X
34When  wilt  you  like  to  pay
this  amount7  17
Any  time  41K
Dry  season  (3rd  quarter)  41X
After  harvest  (end  of  3rd,  begin.  4  24X
3rd,  4th  or  1st  quarter  18X
Why  will  you  like  to  pay  dt  that  time?  17
Enptoyer  covered  24X
Cash  availeble  18X
Selling  the  harvest  12X
Selling  fish  29X
Selling  coffee  18X
SeLting  products  12Z
Selling  fish  and  coffee  6X
Selling  coffee  and  harvest  6X
If  this  insurance  woulo  cover  either  the  cost
of  care  at  the  hospital  or  at  the  hospital,  21
Which  would  you  prefer?
Health  center  33X
Hospital  57X
1 don't  know  10l
Were  you  sick  last  month  and  sought  care?  21
Yes,  sought  care  at  heaLth  center  14K
Yes, sought care at  hospital  19X
No answer or did  not  sought care  67K
35C.  CASE STUDY OF ST. ALPHONSE
The St. Alphonse Health Center  is the first  and  only operating  health  facility  in the urban
health  zone of  Matete, Kinshasa.  Since the Matete  Health  Zone is not  yet functional,  St.
Alphonse  is  supervised  by  the  Kisenso Urban  Health  Zone.  The  Kisenso  zone receives
technical assistance, capital and operating subsidies from the Belgian-sponsored project 'Sante
Pour Tous Kinshasa" (SPTK).  St. Alphonse Health Center began operation  in  1987, largely
through community action channeled through the Development Commission  of the St. Alphonse
Parish.  The health  center  received  investment subsidies from  many donors, including  the
OXFAM Project (Great Britain),  the Canadian and German Embassies, and SPTK. At present,
the health center  is self-financing  with a large profit  margin.
1.  Terms of the Insurance  Plan
The St. Alphonse insurance  plan covers ambulatory curative care episodes of illness at the St.
Alphonse Health  Center.  Plan  members are entitled  to pay a fixed  fee for each episode of
illness up to  five days,  rather  than  paying  for  each day  of  treatment  as non-members are
required  to do.
Table C.l lists the prices according  to payor category (member vs. non-member).  An episode
of illness includes  up to five consultations  and all basic drugs required.  Per visit fees also
include consultation and basic drugs, but for one day of care only.  For both payor categories,
laboratory  exams are charged  separately.  Drugs which are not usually kept  in stock at the
health  center  level  (for  example,  quinine  for  chloroquine-resistant  malaria)  are  charged
separately as well.
Table C.1  Prices,  St.  Alphonse Health Center Kinshasa,  1987-1989
ZAIRES
.............................................................
ADULT  I  CHILD  l
1  -------------  ---------- 1---------------------------
l  l  OIN0N-NEN1NiON-ENBI I  NON-MENSINON..-ON1
-------  IEMBER  |MEMBER  IFIRST  IOTHER INENSER  IFIRST  |OTHER I
IDATE  IPREK!UNIEPISODEIVISIT  |VISITS  IEPIS XE|VISIT  IVISITS I
I------- I-----  I--------I--------I---1-----I---1----  I--1----  ---1--  -----1I
IJAN.  871  50  1  100  I  110  1  50 1  80  (*)  I  (C)  I
IJAN.  88l 150  1  150  1  150  I  S0  I  100  1  100  1  50  1
IJAN.  891  150  1  300  1  200  1  50 1  300  1  200  1  SO  I
INAR  89I 300I  5001 400 1  150  1  500  400 1  150  I
....................................................................
C')  No  price  was  estebltihed  for  non-nember  children  the  first  year.
In  1989  differential  pricing  for  adult/children  was  bwndoned  in
favor  of  one  price  for  slt  age  groups.
The health center also offers prenatal consultations and well-baby care; however these services
are not covered by the insurance plan.  Deliveries are referred  to other facilities,  although the
health  center would like to open a maternity  service in the future.
The population eligible- to join the insurance plan includes the approximately  10,000  residents
of the health  center's  catchment  area.  No census has been carried  out, nor is one planned in
the near future.  Enrollment in the insurance plan is voluntary.  Since the health center opened
in  February  1987, 1,689 residents  have joined  the insurance  plan, although  only about 620
(6.2%) are currently  covered under  the plan.
36According to a member of the St. Alphonse Development Commission, many residents in the
catchment area are salaried workers with employer health coverage. St. Alphonse health center
does not bill employers for care, so there is no record of the number of patients  who may not
have joined the insurance  plan because they are already  covered by their  employer.
The insurance  premium  for  1989 was set in March, at  300 Z ($0.85) per  person.  The  1988
premium price was 150 Z ($0.80), increased from the initial  price of 50 Z ($0.39) in  1987. In
early planning  meetings, community members expressed a preference  for  family enrollment,
but the health  center staff  and development commission members felt  that  without a census
such a system was open to abuse.  All individuals  pay the same premium.
As discussed above, the insurance plan has a co-payment of 500 Z ($1.41) per episode of illness.
The insurance  plan has not established  any deductibles.  In  1987 and  1988, the co-payment
differed  according  to age, with  a lower co-payment paid  by children.  All SPTK-supported
health zones abandoned  this practice in 1989,  in favor of a single co-payment. Table C.l shows
co-payments from past periods.  The episode of illness covered is restricted  to five days, and
does not cover expensive, special drugs.
The health  center  treats patients  who are not members of the insurance plan; in fact, almost
85% of new cases seen at the health  center  in 1988 were in non-members (see Table  C.2 for
utilization  figures).  Non-members do not  qualify  for  the episode of  illness price, but  are
required  to pay for each day of care.  Currently  non-members pay 400 Z ($1.13) for the first
day of care, and  150 Z ($0.42) for each subsequent day of care.  The average number of visits
per episode of illness for non-members thus far in  1989  was 3.6, or an average cost per episode
of 790 Z ($2.23)  [(I visit x 400 Z) + (2.6 visits x 150 Z)]. As with members, while consultations
and  basic drugs are included  in the  price, laboratory  exams and special  drugs are charged
separately.
Table C.2  Utilizatiln,  St.  Alphonse  Health Centar Kinshasa,  1968-1989
........................  ......................................  ............
1968  1  1989
-----  ------------------  -1-----------  -----  ------ 1
1X  IX  I  number  1  I
I  umber  Itotal  irew  I  (8 mo.) Itotal Inew  I
I -utI.  Icas&$  I  (*)  lutil  Icses  I
I-----  --- 1--I--1----  I------  I-----1---  I---1-------1I
Members episodes  1  1,413  1  5.2X1 13.7X1  434  1 3.011  10.3X1
hon-members  first  visit  I  8, 8981  32.6X1  86.3X1  3,788  1  26.4X1  89.7X1
Mon-m'rbers  other  visits(+)I  16,477  1 60.3X1  - 9,710  1  67.861  ---  I
CPH  new  cases enrolled  376 1 1.4Z%  - 302 j  2.1X1  ---  I
CPS  rew  cases enrolted  168  0.6O  1  --  98  1  0.7X1  ---  I
.......  ....  I  --- 1----I-1--  ------- 1I------I------1I
TOTAL:  |27332  |100.OX1iO0.OX|  14.332 1100.  01100.0%1
1--------------  -------  -1-  ------------  --------- 1
Visits  per episode  I  I
(nomrebs)  I  2.9  1  3.6  l
.................................................
*  Jan. to  Sept.,  *xcltud1n  Aprlt  (no deta  avalt. for  April)
*  Follow-up visits  are calculated  by dividing  total  receipts  for  follow-up visits
by priee  per follow-up visit.
372.  Organization  and  Management
The  insurance  plan  began  with  the  ope-1ing of  the  health  center,  in  February  1987.  The
Development  Commission  of  St.  Alphonse  parish  was  instrumental  in  creating  the  health
center  and  mounting  an  awareness  campaign  amnng  the  population  in  the  health  center's
catchment  area.  The  Development  Commission  has  been  in  existence  for  over  10 years,  and
manages  a  diverse  range  of  activities  in  addition  to  the  health  center,  including  a  food
cooperative,  tie-dying  cooperative,  and  an  adult  literacy  program.
The  health  insurance  plan-awareness  campaign  took  a  full  year  and  involved  considerable
effort.  Four  members  of  the  Development  Commission  worked  full-timc  for  two  months,
conducting  door-to-door  vi;its  to  explain  the  purpose  of  the  insurance  plan.  They  were
assisted  by  six  students  from  the  National  Art  Institute  who  were  enrolled  in  the  Institute's
program  in  'animation  culturelle.'  The students  worked  full-time  for  three  months.
In spite  of  this  concentrated  effort,  most residents  were  not  convinced  about  the  benefits  of
joining  an  insurance  plan.  The plan  bcgan  with  only 50 members.  The St. Alphonse  insurance
plan  is a direct  insurance  plan,  offered  by the provider,  which  is both  the center  and  the  zone.
Accounting  for  the  insurance  plan  is mingled  with  that  of the  health  center.  The  price  of the
premium  is set  by  SPTK/health  zone  central  office  staff.  It  was  not  possible  to  meet  with
these  people,  so little  is known  about  how  the  premium  price  is established.
Individuals  may  join  the plan  at any  time  during  the year,  with  coverage  starting  immediately
and  lasting  one  year  from  the  time  of enrollment.  The  only  restriction  is that  people  cannot
join  the  plan  while  they  are sick.  Enrollees  receive  a membership  card  which  specifies  name,
age, sex, membership  number,  date  joined,  and  date  of expiration.  The health  center  nurse  also
records  information  about  each  enrollee  in  a  membership  register.  This  register  records
membership  number,  date  (without  year),  name,  address,  sex, and  age.  Membership  numbers
are  sequential  until  1,000, then  begin  again  with  number  1.  When a person  wishes  to  renew
his or her  membership,  a new card  is issued  (with  a new membership  number)  and  the old card
is destroyed.  Therefore  it is difficult  to analyze  renewal  rates.
There  are  few  recurrent  costs  associated  with  administration  of  the  insurance  plan.  Since
the  plan  began,  no  new registers  or membership  cards  have  been  purchased.  The  membership
verification  process  is very  simple  (the  receptionist  compares  the  membership  card  to  the
person's  national  ID  card),  and  accounting  is combined  with  that  of  the  health  center,  so
personnel  expense  for  record-keeping  is negligible.  The current  cost of printing  a membership
cards  is about  20 Z ($0.06), so the card  expense  for  the  620 current  members  is approximately
12,400 Z ($35).
To identify  plan  members,  as mentioned  above,  the  membership  card  is compared  to national
ID card.  Cards  are  not checked  against  the  membership  register.
Premiums  are  deposited  in  an  account  at  the  parish,  as are  all  receipts  of  the  health  center.
A  member  of  the  Development  Commission  works  at  the  health  center  as an  administrative
assistant,  and  prepares  a monthly  financial  report  according  to  the SPTK  model.  The report
shows  cash flows  as well  as an income  statement.  Premiums  are  recorded  as a cash receipt,  but
not  as income.  No  interest  is earned  on  premiums.
3.  Resource  Mobilization:  Financial  Situation  of  Plan  and Center
Table  C.3  presents  the  combined  financial  situation  of  the  insurance  plan  and  the  health
center  for  1988 and  1989.
The  data  show  that  the  health  center  is extremely  profitable,  with  a  margin  of  almost  65%
in  1988, and  52% in  1989.  Insurance  premiums  and  member  co-payments  do not  contribute  a
38Table C.3  Finmncial Situation,  St.  Alphonse  1988-1989
Nominal Zaires
1988  1989 l)
.........  ..............................  I--------...............
X of  Total  Exp.1  X of  Total  Exp.
OPERATING  REVENUE  ......................  I----------------------
Insurance premium  88,090  4.2K1  77,625  2.2X
Member  episodes  279,300  13.3X1  303,225  8.7X
Non-mesbers  firat  vfait  1,158,950  55.1X12,017,080  57.6X
Non-m  mbers other  visits  823,860  39.2X11,470,525  42.0%
CPN  & CPS  110,600  5.3X1  469,350  13.4X
Sale of  drugs  C*)  544.080  25.9K1  171,675  4.9%
Laboratory  (+)  265,960  12.6X1  579.150  16.5X
Sale of  foodstuffs  163,580  7.8X1  195,150  5.6X
Other  33,710  1.6K1  33,000  0.9X
TOTAL:  3,468,130  164.9%15,316,780  151.7X
OPERATING  EXPENSES  |
Personnel  832,426  39.6X  11,962,990  56.0X
Drugs  and  med.  supplies  977,856  46.5X  11,215,200  34.7%
Supplies,  util.,  mint.  177,121 8.4X  322,043 9.2X
Purchase  foodstuffs  34,475 1  6K  4  500  0.1X
Other  81,785 3.9X  I  0  0.0C
---------....--- 1-------------
TOTAL:  2,103,663  100.0%  13,504.732  100.0X
BALANCE:  1,364,467  64.9K11,812,048  51.7X
*  1989  fIgures  extrapolated  based on 8 months  of  actual  data
A*  fter  Nov.  1988  reverse  from  sales  of  drugs drops sharply.
This my  Indicate  a chnge in  pa  wAnt  system
(more  drugs  included  per  episode)
Laboratory  receIpts  recorded only  for  May  through  Dec.  in  1988
Exchange  rates  whd  Inflation  rates  for  each  year  are  found  in  Amex III
large amount to the total revenue of the health center in either  year Examining revenue as a
percentage  of total  expenses, premiums covered 4.2% of expenses in  1988, and only 2.2% in
1989. Member co-payments covered another  13.3%  of expenses in 1988  (8.7% in 1989). In both
years, nearly  all of  health  center  expenses were covered by consultation  fees paid by  non-
members.  Other  services (sale of drugs, laboratory,  preventive  care, etc.) contributed  to the
positive margin.
4.  Udlization
Table C.2 showed member and non-member utilization  for curative care cases, and combined
utilization  for  preventive  care.  Member episodes accounted  for  13.7%  of  all new cases of
illness in  1988. This share dropped  to 10.3%  in 1989.
Unfortunately,  follow-up  visits  for  members are not  recorded  by the health  center,  so it is
not  possible  to evaluate  from  its  utilization  data  whether  payment  by episode encourages
members to come back to  the health  center  more frequently  than  non-members.  For  non-
members, from 1988 to 1989  the number of visits per episode of illness increased dramatically
from 2.9 visits per episode to 3.6. Changes in the relative  price of follow-up visits compared
to the initial  visit may explain some of this difference  (the relative  price of follow-up visits
39dropped  in the first  two months of  1989, then increased  again in March).  It is also possible
that the diligence with which records are kept at the health center improved somewhat in 1989.
To better  understand  the characteristics  of insured and uninsured  patients,  a random sample
of  consecutive ambulatory  patients  was surveyed  in  October 1989.  The questionnaire  was
written  in French and posed in Lingala by bilingual Zairois interviewers  (see Annex V). Table
C.4 presents  the  characteristics  of  respondents  by  insurance  status  for  this  plan and  the
CASOP,  the other Kinshasa case study, described below. Table V.2 in Annex V documents the
decision  rules for resolving missing and ambiguous data  on membership status,  which arose
in  9% of  responses.At the St. Alphonse center,  79 patients  responded  of  whom  13% were
insured.  At the CASOP, 126 patients  responded of whom 51% were insured.
Table  CA4  Kinshass  Survey:  Population  Characteristics
Insured  Uninsured Valid
Characteristic  (HW74)  (Hu131) Responses
..  .................  ...................................................
Center:
St.  Alphonse  14X  53X  205
CASOP  86X  47X
Gerder:
Female  44X  63X  205
Male  55X  34X
Age group:
0-14  10X  11X  205
15-44  79X  76X
45 and  above  11  13X
Average  +  S.D.  29  *14  27  +13
Receives  a  salary  each  month  42K  33X
Occupation:
Professional,  "cadre"  7X  10X  205
Skfiled  worker  13X  8X
student  24X  16X
Unskilled  worker  24X  16X
Former  1i  2X
Other  11X  13K
None  20K  35K
Eqployer:
State  21K  6X  205
Pare-statal enterprise  3X  2X
Private  enterprise,  for  profit  11K  14X
Private  enterprise,  not  for  profit 6K  3X
Independ"nt  1K  7X
Household  1X  2Z
Other  Os  1X
Hone  or  no  response  56X  66X
Coqen poys for  mdical  care.:
In  full  35X  19X  205
Some  6X  3X
Hon  3K  13X
Hot eployed  56X  66X
Is  nother ftily  meber
_ployed  nd  covered for
medical  expenses?  44X  27X  202
.....................  ...........................................
40As time for  pretesting  the survey and training  the interviewers  was limited to  a few hours,
the survey should be viewed as an indication  of characteristics  rather than a prec,se scientific
inquiry.  The resu!ts show that both insured and uninsured patients are young adults, of whom
about a third  are emiployed. Insured patients  tend to be slightly more likely  to be employed
^nd have better  jobs than uninsured,  but differences  are small.
Table  C.5, based on this  survey, shows actual  paymeLl's reported  by insured  and  uninsured
patients  for their  current  episode.  The results show confirm  that  uninsured  patients  do pay
more  than  insured  patients,  but  both  groups  do  pay  something.  These  data  from  an
independent  source (the patients) confirm  that actual charges are consistent with the official
price list.
Table  C.5  Kinshasa  Survey:  Iltness  and  Expenditures.
.................................  ........................................................  .....................  ......
Insured  Uninsured
(074)  WMzl3l)
Characteristic  Mean  SO  Mean  SD
.......  ............  ............  .........................  ..  ..  .............
Duration  of present tltness
episode  in  days  53  225  27  109
First  visit  for  this  episode.  35X  39X
Number  of previous  visits  for
current  episode  2.0  2.6  1.6  4.2
Payment  for current  visit
In  Zaires  222  521  511  856
Total  payment  for  current  visit  incLuding:
Lab.,  x-ray  end  consultation
SO.00  - t0.99  (O - 430  Zafres).  90°  76
*1.00  - #2.00  (430  - 860 Zaires).  4X  7X
52.01  - S5.00  (861  - 2150  Zaires).  4X  10X
More than  S S (More  than  2150  Zaires)  1X  7r
MAN  0.5  1.2
Nedicine  included  in  total  payment:
Altl  IncLuded  57X  56X
Some inctuded  42X  43X
None  included  1X  1X
Total  payment  for  sit  previous  visits
for  current  episode  in  Zefresmeen  SD)  115  309  308  1,106
Expect  wny  follow  up  for
this  episode  85  85X
Table C.5 also compares utilization  data of insured and non-insured  respondents.  The results
demonstrate  some moral hazard  or adverse  selection, in  that  insured  respondents  had  more
previous visits.  Table C.6 further  describes the attitudes  of the two groups.  Insured  persons
tend to be slightly  better  off  than uninsured;  for example, the time they  would require  to
mobilize  50,000  Z  (S  125) was less than  for  uninsured  respondents.  Table  C.7 presents
questions  asked  separately  of  members and  non-members.  It  is striking  that  43% of  non-
41members had not heard about the plans before.  Thus, posters and displays at the plans' clinics
about  the  insurance  system  might  be  an  effective  and  inexpensive  way  of  increasing
enrollment.
Table C.6 Kinshasa Survey: Population,  Attitudes  and  Opinion
.....  . . . . . . ..  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Insured  Uninsured  Valid
Characteristic  (1174)  WMUI3I)  Responses
.......  .....................................................
Wiould  you be able  to  pay  10,000 Zaires  205
for  an illness  requiring  minor surgery
in  a  hospical?
Could pay  today  35X  34X
Could pay some  other  day'  58X  552
Could never pay or  no response  72  112
*  After  how  many  days? (Average)  11  12
Would  you be able to  pay  50,000 Zaires  205
for  an Illness  requiring  minor surgery
in  a  hospital?
Could pay today  132  112
Could pay some  other  day'  752  70X
Couldc  never pay or  no response  132  20X
*  After  how  many  days? (Average)  30  40
Where  would you get  the  50,000 Zaires
(see question above)?  205
Cash, from household  38X  222
Saving  clubl  or  association  11X  6X
By selling  household items or  Livestock  52  102
Taking a  loan from  somebody
outside  the  household.  232  232
Donation from somebody  outside
the  household  02  1X
Contribution  of  famiLy mrbers  92  192
Other  3X  42
No response  112  152
Would  you suggest this  insurance
plan  to  other  family  mnbers?  852  85X  135*
What  do you think  of  the organization  205
of  health  insurance schemes?
Favourabte  962  922
Not favourable  1X  3X
Do not  know  or  no response  3X  5X
..  .................  ......................................  ...
*  Applicable  only  to  St.  Alphonse.  In  CASOP,  filies  had to  join.
Table C.7  Kirahass Survey: Questions Asked  Separately
of  Insured and Uninsured Respondents
.....................................................
QUESTIONS  2
What are the inconweniences  or  problem
of  your  bership?
Too expensive  6.92
Benefits  not  worth the  fees  I pay  1.42
It  is  necessary to  cow  for  follow
kV visits.  26.4X
Other  15.32
lNothing  47.2X
42LWy  are you not  meaber  of  the  insurance  plan?
Too expensive  15.9X
I  have no money  7.9X
Why  should  I  pay before  I  m  sick?  4.0X
Never heard about this  before  42.9X
I  *  not  often  sick  0.8X
I  did  not  know at  the  time of
enrollment  10  .3
I do  not  trust  this  insurance  5.6X
I  can pay for  each consultation  9.5X
Other  3.2X
......  ..........  _....................................
As in Bwamanda, it was difficult  to characterize  the insurance status of about 18 respondents
(approximately  9% of the respondents).  As shown in Appendix  Table IV.2, however, it was
possible to impute  the membership status  based on responses to other variables.
43D.  CASE STUDY  OF CASOP
The Caisse de Solidarite Ouvriere et Paysanne (CASOP) is sponsored by the Zairian  National
Workers Union (UNTZA).  The health insurance  plan is only one of the many social services
provided  by the CASOP, which  operates  nationwide.  The research  team studied  how the
insurance plan works by looking at the CASOP's only polyclinic in Kinshasa, which serves all
CASOP members in the city.
1.  Terms of the Insurance Plan
The CASOP plan covers ambulatory curative cases of illness treated at the CASOP polyclinic
in Kinshasa.  Plan members are entitled  to pay a lower fee than non-members for each day of
care,  which  includes a  nurse consultation  and  some basic drugs.  Families  of  members are
entitled  to the same benefits  as members, for no additional  premiums.
Table D.1 contains  a list of prices according to payor category.  Theoretically,  there are four
categories:  individual  member,  individual  non-member, company  member, company  non-
member; but there are currently  no companies which are affiliated  with CASOP's clinic that
are not members, so in effect  there are three active payor categories.  Individual  members are
insured and pay least.  Individual  non-members are uninsured individuals.  Company members
are insured and benefit  from having their companies billed the fees for their services. For all
payor categories, laboratory  exams and x-rays are charged separately.  Drugs which are not
usually kept in stock at the health  center  level are charged separately as well.
TabLe 0.1  Price  Lfst
CASOP  PoLyctinic,  1989
l  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~I  i  I  COMPANY
ISERVICE  I  MEMBER  IMON-MEMBERI MEMBER  I
I------  -------------------  -------------------------------
fConsuLtation  with:  I  I  I
IMedicat Assistant  2  250  1  350  1400
iGenerhl  Physician  I  350  1  500  600
Ispeciitized  Physicien*  450  |  700  j  800
|IV  with  drug  1300  |  1550  1600  0
ILaboratory:  BLood  |  100  1  200  |  200  I
ILaboratory:  Stools  I  100  I  200  1  150 I
I  I  I  I  I
INorml  delivery  7  7000  I  10000 |  12000
jXray  (chest,  adult)  |  1400  1500  I  1700  |
..........................................................
* This  Is  the  type  of  coanultctlon  chosen by  out  petients  according  to  the  cifnic  adeinistration.
The  clinic  also  provides  prenatal  care,  vaccinations,  nutrition  demonstrations,  and  minor
surgery, all of which are not covered under the plan.
Nationally,  the CASOP has more than 42,000 contributing  members.  When family  members
are included, the total reaches one quarter  million.  In Kinshasa, the total number of members
(including  families)  was 6,691 in September  ;989.  Since membership is open to  the entire
population,  this represents a tiny fraction  (0.2%) of Kinshasa's total  population  of 3 million.
44While all CASOP members and  their  families  may use the polyclinic,  Table  D.2 shows that
UNTZA staff  and families account for a large fraction  of utilization  (34 to 47% of new cases
in  1988 to  89).  UNTZA  is a  company  member',  and  is billed  for  the wco-payments' of
employees treated.
Table 0.2 UtIlization,  CASOP  Polyclinic,  Kirnshasa, 1988-1989
...................................  ..........................................................
198  189
2 aIL  2l  OtL  2l  tlt IVisitinruber  1I  1  1%  IVisitl
PATOR  VPE  OF  Inumber Inew  ifolLowitotal  lper  1(9 mo.)ltotal  Inww  Ifollowiper  I
CATEGORY VISIT  I  ()  Ic  ese,  icaes  lass$ Ispia. (C)  |util  cases  Icases  Iepia.1
. .--.. I.I….I.I.I.I.  .II-------.I------  I------1------1----1-----  I----1--  I---  -----  I--I--1
ILUITZA  INew  110,548  |  47.5X1  ---  I  --  I  |  3,628  1 33.7X1  ---  I ---  I  I
|staff  IFoltow-upl16,269  I  ---  I 55.8X1  --- I  |  8,987  1  ---  I  48.821  ---  I  I
..........  ITotal  126,8171  I ---  1 52.2X1  2.5  112,615  1  --  I  --  1 43.2X1  3.5  1
. ......  I----  ---  - ------ I- ---- 1--  -----  -- 1--  --------- 1------1-----I
IIndiv.  INew  1 5,325  1 24.021  ---  I  --  I  1 2,456  1 22.821  ---  I  ---  I  I
Ins'bers  IFoltow-upi  6,793  1  -.  1 23.321  ---  1 3,591  1  --  1 19.521  ---  I  I
|  iTotal  112,118 1  ---  I ---  1 23.6X1  2.3  1 6,047  |  ---  I  --  1 20.7X1  2.5  i
1--  --------  I--------1-I------1-I-----1-I-----1-I-----1-----------1I------  1I------  I----1-  I...
IColany  INsW  1  4,079  1 18.421  ---  I --- I  1 2,988  1 27.721  ---  I  ---  I  I
lbilted  IFollow-upI  4,434  1  --  1 15.221  ---  I  1 4,102  1  ---  1 22.3XI  ---  I  I
lm.&  non  iTotuL  |  8,513  |  ---  I  ---  1  16.6X|  2.1  1  7,090  1  ---  I  ---  1  24.3X|  2.4 1
1----------1  I--------1I-------1  -----  1------1-  I------  I  -------  I-1-----1  I-----1I------1I-----I
Nmon-  INew  1 2,264  1 10.221  ---  I  --- I  1 1,707  1 15.821  ---  I  ---  I  I
Ibers  IFotlow-upl  1,648  1  ---  1  5.7X1  --- I  1 1,751  1  ---  I 9.521  ---  I  I
.Total  |  3,912  |  ---  I ---  7.6X|  1.7  |  3,458  |  ---  I ---  I  11.8X1  2.0  1
........  I-----------1I-------1------  I-----  -1-----1-----1----  --- 1------1  I-----1-I-----1-I-----1
ITOTAL  INew  122,216  1100.021  ---  I  ---  I  110,779  1100.021  ---  I ---  I  I
IALL  PAYORSIFollow-UP129,1"  I ---  1100.0X1  ---  I  118.431 1  *--  1100.021  ---  I  I
I  ITOTAL  151,360  1  ---  I  ---  1100.021 2.3  129,210  1  ---  I  ---  1100.021 2.7  1
. .........  .........  ................  ....  ......  ..  ......  .........  .......  .............  .............
Jan.  to  Sept.,  *xcluding  April  (no  data  avail.  for  April)
Foatlow-p  visits  are  calculated  by dividing  totaL  receipts
by  price  per  follow-up  visit.
The monthly  contribution  to  CASOP is  100 Z  ($0.28) for  the  average  worker.  Honorary
members (people  with  large  incomes--self-identified)  pay  200 Z  ($0.56) per  month, while
farmers ('paysans')  are charged 50 Z ($0.!4).  In fact, the latter tariff  is not used, since most
people are able to afford  100 Z in the urban  area of Kinshasa.
Upon joining CASOP, members must pay a one-time fee for the membership booklet (100 Z),
and  six months of contributions  in advance,  or a total  of 700 Z ($1.98).  People who fall  in
arrears  of  their  monthly  dues are given  three  months to pay  up the  full  amount.  If  they
cannot pay back dues by the end of three months, their membership is suspended.  Companies
(e.g. UNTZA) which join the plan for  their employees pay for  the membership booklets, ard
use payroll deduction  to collect the monthly contribution  from  the employees.
Individual  members are subject to a co-payment.  Since the end of  1987,  their co-payment has
been 450 Z ($1.27) for one day of care. (See Table D.l)  A price change is planned very soon.
Companies are billed at the individual  member's 'co-payment'  price for the services provided
to their employees.  Laboratory,  x-ray, minor surgery and some drugs are charged separately.
There are no caps on spending.
45The insurance  plan is voluntary  for  individual  members.  Companies may join voluntarl,,
but  once they  have joined  they  must enroll  all  their  employees.  The employees are  then
required  to make the monthly contributions.
The  health  center  treats  patients  who are not  members of  the  insurance  plan.  Table  D.2
showed that non-members accounted for between 9 to 10%  of new cases in  1988 and  1989. A
similar  payment  system applies, only non-members are charged  higher prices.  The average
number of visits per episode of illness for non-members is lower than the overall average (1.7
compared to 2.3 in  1988), possibly showing that  higher prices discourage people from secking
follow-up treatment.
2.  Organization  and Management
CASOP began in  1968, as a Christian  mutual.  When management changed into the hands of
the Zairian  Workers' Union, the name of the association changed.  CASOP existed a long time
before  the  polyclinic  was added.  By making  a monthly  contribution  to CASOP, members
receive benefits  in  the case of  marriage,  birth,  hospitalization,  need for  social  assistance,
unemployment or a death in the family.  The level of benefits  is set in advance,  usually on an
annual  basis.  For example, a member who contributes  200 Z ($0.56) per month will receive a
hospitalization  benefit  of 50 Z ($0.14) per hospital day.  Family members are entitled  to 25 Z
($0.07) per day.
The member contributions  are collected and managed by committees at the local level ("comite
primaire"). These local funds are divided into differeLt  pools, according  to standard  formula.
For example, 10%  of funds are reserved for hospitalization  benefits, 35% for death  benefits,
3% for marriages.  The local committees must contribute  17%  of the funds  to the polyclinic,
and  15% to administration  at the regional and national  levels.
When the  polyclinic  first  opened, CASOP's idea  was that  membership contributions  would
enable the clinic to provide care at no price to members. This soon proved impossible, because
utilization  was high aind  the services were too expensive. Health services received only a small
portion  of  the  premium.  As CASOP officials  felt  that  a  higher  premium  would  not  be
affordable,  they introduced  co-payments instead.
Polyclinic staff  are all UNTZA personnel, and are paid through the UNTZA personnel office
and  not through  the polyclinic.  This situation  is changing, however; a decision was made in
May 1989 to make the polyclinic more independent  from UNTZA.
CASOP is a direct  insurance plan, offered  by the provider.  This status may change, howevcr,
as  the  policy  of  making  the  polyclinic  'more  independent"  evolves.  Accounting  for  the
insurance  plan is mingled with that  of the clinic.
The monthly contribution  amount is set to take into account the costs of the benefits covered
(hospitalizations,  deaths)  based  on benefits  paid  out  in  the  past  and  the cost of  living  in
Kinshasa.  It isn't clear  how the percentage of the total  fund  allocated to the polyclinic (30%
in  1988, 17% in 1989) is set.
Individuals  may join  the plan at any  time during  the year (even when they  are sick), with
coverage  starting  immediately  and  lasting  until  the member stops paying dues.  Enrollees
receive a membership  booklet which specifies name, age, membership number, date  joined,
profession and marital  status.  A photo of the member is included as well. Similar information
is filled  in for the spouse; for children,  name and age arc recorded.  There are many pages in
the booklet, where stamps are affixed  to record payment of monthly contributions.
It  is difficult  to estimate  the recurrent  cost of  administering  the insurance  plan, since it is
part of a larger social insurance  program with many administrative  levels.  The membership
46verification  process is not time-consuming (the receptionist  checks the membership card to be
sure it is us?  to date, or notes the employee ID number in the case of company memberships).
It was difficult  to assess the accounting procedures followed for billing company members or
monitoring  the insurance  plan.
Premiums are paid to local committees, who forward  a percentage of the premium payments
to the polyclinic.  The amount received by the polyclinic in 1988 (fiscal year ending October
1989) was approximately  403,980 Z ($1,140).
3.  Resource Mobilization: Financial  Situation of Plan and Clinic
Despite  repeated  attempts  to obtain  financial  data  about  the receipts  and  expenses of  the
polyclinic,  the  team  failed  to obtain  any  financial  reports  or summaries.  The accounting
systems of CASOP and the polyclinic are in extreme disorder.
4.  Utilization
Table  D.2 shows member  and  non-member utilization  for  curative  care  cases.  Individual
members accounted for 23 to 24% of all new cases of illness in 1988 and  1989. UNTZA staff,
who benefit  from  company membership', accounted for 48% of new cases in  1988, but only
34% thus far  in 1989. Non-members accounted for only  10%  of all new cases treated  in 1988,
however the percentage of non-members seen has increased to  16%  in  1989.
The number of  visits per  case for  non-members is lower than  the average  (2.0 compared to
2.7 in 1989). The highest number of  visits per episode is found  in the UNTZA staff  group,
with 3.5 visits per episode. The greater  number of visits among insured persons suggests that
moral hazard  or adverse selection operates to some degree.
47E  OTHER INSURANCE PLANS
Some descriptive  information  was obtained  on four  other insurance  plans.  The findings  are
summarized in Table E.1 and described below.
Table E.1 Characteristics  of  Other  insureace Plns
,..........................................................................
REIEF  NASISI  UPW  SNHR
..........................................................................
Region  Kinfhasb  Kivu  Notional  Rutshuru Hz
(Shlaba?)
Ruralt/Urban  Urban  Rural  Painly  Urban  Rural
Mnagement  Zairian  PVO  Health Zone  Zafrian  PVO  SNHR
Year Started  19b6  1988  1966  ?
Eligible  MM00  214,240  8  sillion  SNHR  .mbers
Population  & fmilies
Nuwber of  roo  to  1000  7  few  20  fmilies
Nf"rs
Services  All  hosp. &  ob.  Hospital  Hospital  Hospital
Covered  incL.  referrels  services  & ambulatory  services
Premiu  500/mo.  sdult  150 Z/  year  ?  SDOZ/o.
250/mo.  child
Discounted rates
for  poor L  farmers
,  ..  .........  ........................  ..................................................
1.  Reseau Medecins de Familles (REMEF)
REMEF  is  a  direct  insurance  plan  which  functions  like  a  ataff  health  maintenance
otganization  (HMO). Started  in February  1986 by a Zairian  doctor who had studied  family
medicine  in the United  States, the REMEF clinic  is the base for  medical staff  who provide
comprehensive  health  services  and  outreach  activities  to  the  families  in  the  nearby
communities.  The REMEF has  benefitted  from  some Canadian  assistance  and  sponsors a
private  nursing  school in  addition  to the polyclinic.  The focus of the REMEF is maternal
and  child health  services.
Li.  Terms of the Insurance Plan
The  REMEF insurance  plan covers all  ambulatory  and  inpatient  services, including  drugs
and  laboratory,  surgical  interventions,  and  preventive  care  services.  In  May  1989 the
polyclinic  moved to its current  location, where  yive  beds are available  for  hospitalizations.
There  is an additional  maternity  bed as well.  If  a patient  requires  referral  to a secondary
hospital or medical specialist, the cost of the referral  and all subsequent  services is assumed
by the plan.
While no census exists, the size of the community served is assumed to be about 7,000,  of whom
48between 700 to  1,000 (10 to  14%) are members who pay their  monthly premiums  regularly.
Since  1986, the  REMEF  has had  a  total  of  about  2,000 members.  Currently  small local
businesses who enroll employecv and  their dependents account  for  557 members, or between
55 to 80% of total  membership.
In 1989, the adult  monthly membership premium was set at 5;80  Z ($1.41), or 6,000 Z ($16.92)
per  person per  year.  Students  and  children  are charged  a  lower rate  of 250 Z ($0.70) per
month, or 3,000 Z ($8.47) per peCson  per year.  Farmers ('paysan") are also charged the lower
rate of 250 Z.  A full-time  public relations  worker assumes the task of verifying  membership
category,  either  by calling schools or making  home visits.  Lower  income families  may be
charged different  rates, depending on the decision of the REMEF administrator,  again pending
investigation  by the public  relations  worker.  Company membership  rates  are  the same as
individual  rates.
The plan has no limits on spending or duration  of episodes of illness. There are no deductibles
or  co-payments.  Membership is voluntary  (except in  the case of  company employees) and
whole families are not required  to join if one member joins.  The plan covers both  treatment
at the facility  as well as the cost of referrals  elsewhere.
Non-insured  residcn:s may be treated at the faci'ity.  They are charged 500 Z ($1.41) for each
consultation,  with drugs and laboratory  payable separately.  It is rare that non-members come
to the facility  to be treated,  however.
L  Resourc  Mobilization  -
Record-keeping  is not well-developed at the REMEF polyclinic, so it is difficult  to analyze
the financial  situation  of the plan.  No utilization  registers or financial  account  books were
available  for review, and procedures for recording and  verifying  membership seem lax.
To gain some estimate of the size of operations, salary information  was obtained for polyclinic
employees other than doctors.  Monthly salary expense excluding REMNEF's  two doctors (one
of whom is the Director) is approximately  95,000 Z ($268). Assuming a salary of 150,000  Z per
month for each doctor (the high-end of the Bwamanda pay range), total personnel expense is
about  395,000 Z  ($1,115) per  month, or 4.7 million  Z ($13,380) per  year.  Since personnel
expense probably accounts for 60% of total expenses (it was 56% at St. Alphonse), REMEF's
total  annual  expenses for polyclinic operations may be 8 million Z or more ($22,590).
Revenue  from  premiums cannot  be estimated  accurately,  since the  number  of  individuals
falling  into each membership category is unknown.  But even if all members were adult  and
the maximum membership figure  is assumed (1,000), revenue only comes to 6 million Z per
year.  This  indicates that  REMEF may be receiving external  operating  subsidies from some
source, or that  the estimates of doctors' salaries and/or  total membership are wrong.
1,1  Utilization
'Ttilization  figures were available  for two months, August and September 1989. These figures
sn,o)w  that  utilization  is much lower than either  CASOP or St. Alphonse.  REMIEF treated an
average of 152 new cases per month in Aug. to Sept. 1989, whereas the average number of new
cases treated  each month at St. Alphonse is about 528, and at CASOP the number is close to
1,200. REMIEF't utilization  data are shown in Table E.2.
9 The average family  size of these members is small (3.2) which may be due to the large
number  of single persons employed in the hotel industry.  Two small hotels are among the
businesses which have contracted  with  REMEF to provide health  care to employees.
49Table  E.2 Utilization  Data  (Cll  patients)  at  REMEF
Aug.  89  Sapt.  89
New  Cases  138  16S
Follow-up  Visits  147  162
Hospitalizations  19  3
Deliveries  3  4
Transfers  0  1
Growth  Monitoring  Visits  35  26
Dwes of  Vaccines  Administered  128  141
REMEF's  staff  is dedicated  and  quality  of care  seems very  high.  The facility  was extremely
clean,  bright,  well-supplied  and  well-equipped.  Technical  assistance  in  organization  of
management  systems  and  in  management  training  would  be well-placed,  to assure  continued
evaluation  and  success  of  this  health  insurance  experiment.  The  PASS  may  also  wish  to
conduct  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  the  costs  associated  with  the  plan,  especially  the  plan's
policy  of paying  for  the  treatment  costs  of  all  cases  referred  to other  providers.
2.  Masisi  Health  Zone  Insurance  Plan
The  rural  h, alth  zone  of  Masisi  is  located  in  the  Kivu  Region,  covering  a  population  of
approximate.y  214,240.  Only  recently  started,  the  health  zone  benefits  from  the  assistance
of  a  Belgian  Cooperation  Zonal  Chief  Medical  Officer  who  has  had  previous  experience
starting-up  the zone  of Kirotche,  in  the same  region.  Masisi has  a  142-bed  reference  hospital
and  19 health  centers  or health  posts.  To increase  econcmic  access  to health  services  the  zone
began  offering  a health  insurance  plan  in  1988.  The Medicin  Chef  de  Zone  (MCZ) delivered
a presentation  about  the  insurance  plan  at the  SANRU  national  conference  in  1989.  Since the
research  team  for  this  study  did  not  have  time  to  visit  Masisi,  this  section  is  based  on  the
MCZ's  presentation  at  the  SANRU  conference,  as well  as conversations  with  staff  from  the
Belgian  Cooperation  and  SANRU.
24.  Terms  of  the  Insurance  Plan
The  plan  covers  all  hospital  services  including  deliveries  and  chronic  care.  The  premium
charged  in  1989  was  150 Z  (S0.42)  per  person  per  year,  calculated  on  an  actuarial  basis
assuming  a hospitalization  rate  of  4.9%, an average  cost per  hospitalization  of 2,000 Z (about
SI I in  1988), and  a 5G%  margia  for  inflation.  Premiums  are invested  in the  purchase  of drugs
for  the  central  pharmacy.  The  hospital  bills  the  plan  for  services  rendered  to  members.
Members  are  identified  by  a  membership  card  which  is compared  to a  membership  register
kept  at  the  hospital.
Enrollment  of  members  takes  place  at  the  health  center  and  community  level,  with  the
assistance  of  village  health  workers  and  health  center  nurses.  Family  enrollment  was  not
required  in  the  past,  but  is  now  seen  as an  important  ingredient  to financial  sustainability,
as discussed  below.
2,  SUtilization and  Success  of  the  Plan
Enrollment  figures  are  unknown,  but  the experience  of the  first  year  showed  that  enrollment
was low and  the  plan  was in  deficit  after  only  six  months  of  operation.  The MCZ  attributes
SOthe early  failure  of the plan to the problem of adverse selection.  His solution was to try  to
enroll  greater  numbers  of  the population,  and  to  require  that  whole  families  join  if  one
member within one family  joins.  The MCZ also observed that it was very difficult  to enroll
residents who lived far  away from  the hospital.  More than price, distance  seemed to have a
much greater  effect  on access to  hospital care.  According to  the manager  of  the SANRU
project  (which  provides  assistance  to Masisi), an  additional  constraint  may  be the lack of
village structure  in the area, which makes community organizing and the conduct of awareness
campaigns difficult.
The Masisi experiment  is ongoing.  The study  team encourages the Government  of Zaire  to
monitor  tnis  experiment  and  conduct  an  evaluation  of  its success after  two  full  years of
operation.
3.  Mutuelle 'Union  et Prevoyance  (UPM)
Created  in  1986, the UPM is a  non-profit  association  sponsored by several  workers unions
and  medical providers,  including  UNTZA, the Confederation  Internationale  des Syndicats
Libres (CISL), the Confederation  Mondiale du Travail  (CMT), the Clinique  Internationale  de
Kinshasa, Mecial Service International,  and the Institut  National de Securite Sociale (in 1988).
The UPM is currently  operational,  but on a very limited  basis.  The plan  is proposed to be
extended  nationally,  and  is  indirect  (i.e. the  UPM is not  the  health  care  provider).  It's
objective is to offer  both ambulatory and hospitalization insurance to the employed population
through  contracts  with health  centers and hospitals.
4.  SNHR Employees in Rutshuru
According to a USAID official,  20 employees of Service National d'Hydrolique  Rural (SNHR)
in the rural  station  of Rutshuru  (south-eastern  Zaire)  started  a small cooperative,  to assure
financing  for  health  care needs of the group and  family  members.  In principle,  the SNHR
pays for  health  care services for  the employees and  their  dependents;  however,  in practice
hospital  bills  were  left  unpaid.  Finally,  the  hospital  began refusing  to  treat  the  SNHR
employees unless they paid cash in advance.  The employees decided  to organize  themselves
and  create an  insurance  fund;  they began by contributing  500 Z ($1.41) per  employee per
month to the fund.  Decisions to spend the insurance money are made by the whole group, on
a case-by-case basis.  According to the USAID official,  the experiment  seems to be working
well.
The  team  suggests that  future  research  regarding  insurance  should  try  to  obtain  more
information  about the success of this experiment.
51F.  INFORMAL  ASSOCIATIONS
To explore a possible base for insurance  systems in existing  informal  savings associations, a
Zairian  sociologist conducted  interviews  with 50 members from  17 associations.  Fourteen of
the associatioas were located in Kinshasa, while three were in Bwamanda. The sociologist also
drew  on her  previous  research  and  publications  on  "likelemba" and  "moziki" associations,
conducted  for the Department of Women's  Condition  (21).
Likelemba  associations are  strictly  rotating  savings clubs,  where  members contribute  a  set
amount at a set time interval,  with one member receiving the pool at each collection interval.
For example, in a likelemba with ten members, each contributing  1,000 Zaires per month, the
"savings pool" is 10,000  Zaires, which will go to a different  member each month.  The members
of a likelemba association do not need to meet each time the collection takes place; usually one
person is assigned the task of collecting the members' contributions  and distributing  the pool
to the recipient.  There are no provisions for  paying interest  or 'bidding"  to obtain  a more
favorable  (earlier) place in the cycle as occurs with Wang  shares in Thailand;  however, people
who received the savings pool early during the first cycle move to the end for the second cycle.
Moziki associations have the same structure  of a rotating  savings club and add two additional
featurcs.  First,  moziki members get together for a social gathering  at the time the collection
is made.  Members make regular  contributions  toward  the refreshments  for  this  gathering.
Second, the moziki associations often  include an emergency loan fund  ("caisse de secours").
Members contribute  a fixed amount to this emergency fund each time they get together.  If a
member is in difficulty  and  needs to raise a large sum of cash quickly, he or she can request
a loan from the emergency fund, repayable usually within  I to 2 months, without interest.  At
the end of the moziki cycle (i.e. when each member has had a turn to receive the money from
the savings  pool), the emergency  loan fund  is divided  up and  redistributed  evenly  to all
members.
As an indication  of the frequency  of such associations, an administrative  census in Bokoro
town identified  12 likelemba or moziki which have over  1,000 registered  members.  Another
association  in Kempa (12 km from  Bokoro) counts  100 members.  Of these 13 associations, 8
made payments for  hospitalization.
Eleven  likelemba  associations  and  six  moziki  associations  were  surveyed.  The  general
characteristics  of the associations are discussed below.
1.  Size and Membership
The associations  ranged in size from 4 to 20 members, with  an average size of  10 members.
The  likelemba  were  slightly  smaller  than  the  moziki  associations.  In  about  half  of  the
associations  all  members were of  the  same sex.  In  both  types of  associations,  65-68% of
members were female.
Members represented  a range of  occupations:  ;nerchants  and  traders,  food sellers, salaried
workers,  teachers,  government  employees,  housewives,  and  some  "family'  associations
(including  members of the same family).  Six of the associations regrouped  people with the
same occupation or employer.  More than occupation,  trust  and  rapport  among members, as
well as a similar  ability  and  willingness to save, seemed most important  to the success of an
association.
2.  Contributions
Frequency  of contributions  and  meetings ranged from every two days to once a month, with
members contributing  from  1,000 Z ($2.33) to 100,000  Zaires ($232.50). Comparing equivalent
monthly  contributions,  the average contribution  for the 17 associations studied was 20,600 Z
52($47.91). Excluding three  associations with contributions  of 50,000 Z or higher, the average
drops to  13,353 Z ($31.05).
3.  Reasons for Saving
Fifty  members were asked what they would do with the savings pool when it was their  turn
to  receive  it.  The  most  frequently  cited  responses were  business  investment  (44%) and
purchase  of a household durable  good (34%). About  8% said they would use the  money to
pay  for  education,  while  14% cited  other  uses, including  purchase of  clothing  or jewelry,
financing  for a trip, and security  deposit for housing.
Since school  fees are  usually  paid  in  August and  September,  most members had  probably
already  found  the funds  to  pay for  education  by the  time of  the survey  in  October, thus
education  did  not  rate  high  among  reasons  for  saving.  Surprisingly,  no  members cited
purchase of health care services as a reason for saving.  The emergency loan funds organized
through  moziki associations were used to purchase health care, however, as described  below.
4.  Emergency Loan Funds
Four  of  the six  moziki associations  studied  had emergency  loan funds  to which  members
contributed  regularly.  Equivalent  monthly contributions  to the loan fund  ranged from  900
Z ($2.09) to 2,000 Z ($4.65) per member, creating a monthly pool of 9,000 to 40,000 Z ($21 to
$93). Since the loan pool is additive,  the total  pool can grow to 81,000 to 800,000 Z ($188 to
$1,860) by the end of the cycle.
In the four  associations with  loan funds,  10 of 54 members (18%) had received loans in  the
past  12 months.  Loans ranged from  10,000 to 50,000 Z ($23 to $166), with  an average  loan
size of 27,500 ($64).  Four loans were made for  health-related  reasons; three helped finance
birth, and  one was for a non-maternity  hospitalization.  Other  reasons for loans were deaths
or marriages.  Loans were repaid  in I to 2 months, without  interest.
An additional  function  of  the  loan fund  is to assure  that  the  association  does not  falter
because one member fail make his or her contribution  during a particular  interval.  The loan
fund  is used to complete the member's contribution,  and the member repays the fund  before
the next meeting.
In the two moziki associations without  loan funds (both  of which  were located in the rural
area  of Bwamanda), members stated  that  collections were sometimes taken  up for members
facing extreme difficulties.  This money was given, not loaned, to the member in need.  In a
recent case, 500 Z ($1.16) was collected from each member for a total of 3,000 Z ($7) to give
to another member who had been hospitalized.  This amount represents about two-thirds of the
standard  price of a hospitalization  in the internal  medicine ward.
5S  Use of Money Lenders for Medical Emergencies
A recent World Bank study of savings and credit cooperatives in Zaire documents the use of
money lenders  as a source of  informal  credit  (22).  In the associations surveyed,  members
were asked if they had ever borrowed money from  a money lender to pay for extraordinary
health  expenses.  Of the 50 members surveyed, one admitted  she had borrowed 20,000 Z ($46)
to pay for  her sister's operation.  She repaid  the loan in one month, with 50% interest.  The
sociologist  conducting  the  interviews  noted  that  the  practice  of  using  money lenders  is
considered embarrassing, however, so people may have been reluctant  to admit  that they used
money lenders.
536.  Rolea of Informal Associations
In conclusion, informal  savings associations are used by many people in both rural and urban
areas  as a  way  to  put  aside a  block of  money for  large  consumer  purchases,  predictable
education expenses or business investment.  The rotating  savings funds are not used currently
to provide a cushion of security in case of medical emergency or other unexpected  needs.  A
subset of informal savings associations--the moziki associations--does provide a mechanism for
financing  catastrophic  hcalth care by granting short-term  loans to members.
Because mcmbership  in  informal  associations  is  very  small (4 to  20 members),  insurance
schemes would not be feasible.  The emergency loan funds are a good alternative,  however,
and associations should be encouraged to provide this service to members. Operations research
might also explore the possibility of lengthening the repayment period for loans, and charging
interest.  These options  may not be feasible,  however, due to the short  life of most of these
informal  associations.  Most informal  associations lasted less than  a year, in  the sense that
membership generally turned over after one or two cycles when the savings objective had been
obtained.  Some of the same members may form a subsequent  informal  association,  but  it is
considered a different  association.
The  savings and  credit  study  proposed  many  ways in  which  donors  can  help  strengthen
COOPECs (Savings and Credit  Cooperatives), another  more formal  but still  grass-roots type
of savings association.  The study  team recommends that  the PASS implement  that  study's
recommendations,  especially  to  provide  training  in  financial  management  to  COOPEC
managers  and  administrative  staff.  As  COOPEC organizations  begin  to  function  more
effectively,  the possibility of providing health insurance through COOPECs directly (or using
COOPECs to help administer  insurance  plans) can be explored.
54III.  CONCLUSIONS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS
The case  studies  in  this  report  have  described  3  varied  group  of  insurance  schemes  for  rural
and  urban  populations  in Zaire.  Several  factors  can  be identified  which  favor  or hinder  the
replicability  and  the development  of health  insurance  plans.  These conclusions  summarize  the
13  lessons  learned  from  the  case  studies,  and  offer  recommendations  for  next  steps.  Thc
recommendations  seek  to strengthen  existing  systems,  to learn  from  Zaire's  rich  experiencc  in
health  insurance,  to extend  the existing  systems,  and  to encourage  appropriate  initiatives.  Our
findings  do  not  support  the  rapid  implementation  of  a  nation  wide  conventional  health
insurance  system  as a  feasible  solution.  Instead,  decentralized,  locally  managcd  plaais seems
to be a  key  success  factor.
A.  TERMS  OF THE  INSURANCE  PLAN
l.  The Insurance Schemes Cover Selective  Types of  Services
Theories  of  risk  pooling  suggest  that  insurance  is  most  appropriate  for  events  which  are
infrequent  but  would cause  severe  financial  hardship.  Inpatient  care and  treatment  of certain
chronic  illnesses  in rural  Zaire  meet  this  criterion.  A typical  rural  hospital  admission  costing
$  15, for  example,  would  consume  one  month's  income  for  a  Zairois  earning  the  per  capita
GDP.  Several  of the  systems  did,  indeed,  insure  inpatient  care:  Bwamanda,  REMEF,  Masisi,
and  UPM.  It  was striking,  however,  that  the  systems  in  the  other  case  studies  (CASOP,  St.
Alphonse,  and  Bokoro)  insured  only  outpatient  care.  The  framers  of  the  Bokoro  plan  had
wanted  insure  both  inpatient  and  outpatient  care  but found  that  the resources  were sufficient
only for  outpatient  care.  Whereas the schemes  in Bwamanda  and  Masisi explicitly  covered  care
of chronic  illnesses,  the  systems  in Bokoro,  St.  Alphonse,  and  CASOP  excluded  it.
Insurance  for  ambulatory  services,  while  theoretically  less important  than  inpatient  services,
seems  more  attractive  to  many  consumers.  As  ambulatory  care  is  frequently  consumed,
consumers  will  immediately  recognize  the  value  of insurance  coverage.  Also,  insurance  may
provide  a way  to pay  for  care  at  a time  that  cash  is more  readily  available,  such  as at  hai *  cst
time.  The consumer  surveys  in this  study  indicated  the attractiveness  of covering  ambulator  y
care.  Among  insured  respondents  in  Bwamanda,  81% would  like  to  increase  their  premiums
sufficiently  to cover  ambulatory  care.  Among  respondents  in the  Kinshasa  survey,  85% would
recommend  their  current  largely  ambulatory  insurance  plan  to their  family.  The  argument
against  such  insurance  is that  moral  hazard  (excessive  use of  the  insuied  services)  and  added
administrative  costs  make  such  coverage  much  more  expensive  than  paying  for  the  services
directly.
2.  The  Most Successful  Plans  Have  Modest  Premiums
The  fuller  the  range  and  depth  of  insured  services,  the  higher  the  required  premium  is.
Among  the  plans  studied  here,  Bwamanda  and  CASOP  had  the  most  members,  with  134,680
and  42,000 (nationlly)  respectively.  The  1989 annual  premiums  per  family  member  were  125
Z  (US  $0.29)  in  Bwamanda  and  1,200  Z  ($2.79,  a  modest  amount  for  Kinshasa)  plus  an
enrollment  fee  in CASOP  (100 Z  per  worker  per  month  for  an  assumed  family  of  6).  These
plans  limited  services  to those affordable  within  these  financial  constraints.  T'ie  Bwamanda
plan  was essentially  limited  to inpatient  care  that  met three  conditions:  the  patient  had  been
referred  from  a  health  center  within  the  system,  hospital  staff  confirmed  the  need  fol
admission,  and  the  care  was  provided  *n the  hospital  offering  the  insurance.  In  CASOP,
individual  membership  provided  only  a  modest  reduction  in  fees.  At  their  Kinshasa
polyclinic,  insurance  lowered  the  price  of  the  most  frequently  chosen  consultation
(consultation  with  a specialized  physician)  by only  36%, from  700 Z for  a non-member  to 450
Z for  a  member.
By  contrast,  in  rural  Bokoro  the  annual  premium  per  person  (not  per  family)  was  1200  Z
55($2.79).  In  the  survey  in  Bokoro,  respondents  indicated  that  they  could  afford  an  annual
premium  of  100 to 200 Z.  The only  subscribers  in Bokoro  were employees  whose premia  were
paid  by  their  companies.  The  plan  insured  only  4.5% of the  zone's  population.  The  premium
was beyond  the  financial  means  of  potential  individual  members.
B.  ORGANIZATION  AND  MANAGEMENT
1.  An Acceptablc  Quality  of  Services  Is a  Precondition  for  Insurance
It  is  very  difficult  to  measure  quality  of  care  without  first  developing  common  standards,
and  secondly  conducting  utilization  reviews  to examine  the  appropriateness  of diagnoses  and
treatments,  evaluate  patient  outcomes,  and  investigate  deviations  from  standard  protocols.
Lacking  common standards  and  historical  utilization  reviews,  it is impossible  to detect  a causal
relationship  between  the  organization  of  a  health  insurance  plan,  and  changes  in  quality  of
patient  care.  It  is possible  to record  observations  about  general  quality  measures,  however,
including  availability  of drugs,  training  and  level of staffing,  and  condition  of infrastructure.
It  is  also  possible  to  formulate  hypotheses  about  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between
insurance  systems  and  quality  of  care,  even  if  such  hypotheses  cannot  be  tested  without
additional  data  collection.
A  likely  hypothesis  is  that  health  providers  which  offer  insurance  programs  have  higher
quality  of care  than  health  providers  which  do  not  have  any  form  of  community  financing
system (user  fees, insurance,  or other).  This  is because  community  financing  systems,  including
health  insurance  plans,  increase  the  financial  resources  available  to health  providers,  thereby
allowing  the  providers  to spend  more  on  quality  improvements  (assuring  drug  supply,  hiring
and  training  staff,  etc.).  There  is no reason  to believe,  however,  that  insurance  systems  would
be any  better  at  improving  quality  than  user  fee systems,  except  that  insurance  systems  may
be able  to mobilize  greater  financial  resources,  depending  on how premiums  are  priced,  levels
of enrollment,  and  how  premium  revenues  are  invested.
Bwainanda,  Bokoro,  St. Alphonse,  and  CASOP, all  had  high  quality  of care,  in terms  of general
indicators  such  as drug  supply,  staffing  and  infrastructure  (see  Table  11.2 in Section  II).  All
four  providers  had  a  steady  supply  of  drugs  with  very  infrequent  stock-outs.  Bwamanda,
Bokoro  and  CASOP all  have  several  doctors  and  well-trained  (A-I  level)  nurses;  St. Alphonse
Health  Center  has  several  well-trained  nursing  staff.  All  four  facilities  have  good  to  fair
infrastructure,  with  well-maintained  buildings  and  most essential  equipment.  The  facilities
were busy  with  patients,  suggesting  that  patients  had sufficient  confidence  to spend  their  time
and  money  to seek treatment.  Compared  to other  health  zones  receiving  donor  assistance  (for
example,  from  the  SANRU  project  or  Sante  Pour  Tous  Kinshasa),  the  quality  of care  at  the
facilities  studied  was about  equal.  Compared  to non-donor  assisted  zones,  however,  quality
was much  higher.
Studies  elsewhere  in Africa,  such as Rwanda,  have  demon3trated  that  the population  is willing
to  pay  substantially  for  the  availability  of  drugs  [24].  If  drugs  are  absent,  patients  lack
confidence  in  the  facility  and  few  will  use  it.  Before  trying  to develop  health  insurance,  it
would  be important  to assure  that  patients  have  confidence  in the  provider(s)  covered  under
the  insurance.
If  a  health  facility  had  poor  quality  due  to  inadequate  resources,  it  seems  unlikely  that
creation  of health  insurance  alone  could  break  the cycle.  However,  if  some external  assistance
(funding,  qualified  personnel,  donated  supplies,  or technical  assistance)  could  raise  quality  and
confidence  for  a  period  of  time,  then  insurance  could  help  make  those  improvements
sustainable.
562.  Voluntary  Schemes  Have  Found  It  Important  to Sensitize  the Population
To  obtain  widespread  enrollment,  a  voluntary  insurance  system  needs  to  sensitize  the
population  to its value.  In systems  organized  through  a  health  zone, the  workers  in that  zone
can  organize  this  enrollment.  In  Bwamanda,  this  awareness  campaign  functioned  well  and
over 60% of the zone's  population  was enrolled  in both  1988 and  1989.  As enrollment  occurred
at  a  specific  time,  village  meetings  were  held  at  that  time  to  promote  the  system.  Health
workers  received  a  commission  (3%  of  the  premiums  they  collected)  to  reinLorce  their
enthusiasm.
In Bokoro,  on  the other  hand,  workers  in  health  centers  received  no  incentive,  did  not appear
interested  in  the  subscription  plan,  and  enrollment  was  low.  In  St.  Alphonse,  the  parish
development  committee  promoted  enrollment  and  conducted  a door-to-door  campaign,  though
current  enrollment  is only  about  6.2% of the  population  of  the urban  zone.  (As this  approach
probably  permitted  only  a single  contact  with  each  potential  enrollee,  it  may  not  have  been
that  effective.)  Because  village  leaders  often  command  the  respect  of  the  population,  their
endorsement  of a  new system  can  be a strong  force  in sensitizing  the  population  to  the  value
of  a  new system.
There  may  be many  more  opportunities  for  well  functioning  voluntary  associations  to  add
health  insurance  to  their  activities.  The  Commission  mentioned  in  the  introduction  to  this
report  identified  562 currently  operating  associations  of all  types.  A  health  provider  could
work  in partnership  with  several  mutual  associations  in its vicinity  to offer  health  insurance.
The  health  provider  would  offer  preferred  access  to  members  of  the  affiliated  voluntary
associations.  The  associations  would  provide  some oversight  over  the  quality  and  charges  for
services  and  would  market  an  insurance  system  to  its members.  In  the  United  States,  many
professional  associations  offer  life  and  health  insurance  to their  members  in  this  way.
3.  Committed,  Decentralized  Management  Provides  Flexibility  and  Accountability
All  of  the  systems  studied  were  under  local  control.  The  one  national  system,  CASOP,
delegated  financial  responsibility  to local  councils.  Decentralization  can  be important  even
within  an  insurance  system.  In  Bokoro,  each  health  center  exercised  some  control  over  its
profits.  As only  a 25% share  was allocated  for  its  immediate  use and  deficits  could  be passed
on  to other  health  centers,  there  was  little  incentive  for  good  financial  performance.
All of  the  systems  visited  in the  course  of  this  study  were  run  by  health  providers.  These  so
called  direct  insurance  systems  offer  important  advantages  in  efficiency  and  control  over
indirect  insurance  systems,  in which  the insurer  pays some independent  provider  for  care.  The
indirect  systems  raise  many  questions  of  financial  control.  The  insurer  must  assure  that  the
member  needs  the  service  being  requested,  that  the  chosen  provider  is competent  to perform
the  service,  that  it  actually  was  performed,  that  the  insured  is  the  actual  recipient  of  the
service,  and  that  the  fee  was appropriate.  In a provider  based  system,  many  of the  inherent
conflicts  between  the  insurer  and  the  provider  are  avoided.
Committed  administrators  contributed  to the success  of the  Bwamanda  system.  The  director
of  the  CDI  Medical  Service  is a  Belgian  physician  who  has  worked  14 years  in  Bwamanda.
Other  personnel,  from  the  insurance  plan  administrator  to  the  health  center  nurses,  also
believed  in the  system.  While nurses  welcomed  the commission  of  3% of  the  premium  income
they  collected,  they  also  seemed  .o appreciate  being  part  of  a  well  functioning  system  that
allowed  them  to use the  locally  available  resources  to provide  health  care  to their  population.
4.  Simple  Control  Methods  Can  Rcduce  Risks  of  Error  or Fraud
Widespread  error  or  fraud  would  undermine  the  financial  viability  of  a  health  insurance
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approaches  for  many  of them.
(a)  Assuring  that  premium  income  is received  and  accounted  for  for  all  gersons  recorded
asD2yin&.  The  system  of printed  stamps  in Bwamanda  provided  a useful  device.  Each  health
center  is  issued  a  specific  quantities  of  two-part  enrollment  stamps  during  the  enrollment
period.  Upon  payment,  a  member  is given  a  stamp  for  each  household  member.  At  each
supcr'  isory  visit  during  enrollment,  the  zone's  financial  officer  withdraws  the  cash  on  hand
and  verifies  that  it matches  the  value  of  stamps  distributed.
(b)  Assuring  that  persons  claiming  to  be insured  have  paid  the  current  premium.  Again,
in  Bwamnanda one  part  of each  of the above-mentioned  stamps  was affixed  to the  back  of  the
family's  health  card  kept  at  the center;  the  other  to individual  cards  retained  by  each  person.
All  stamps  are  signed  to  validate  them.  When  a  member  seeks  hospital  care,  he  (or  his
guardian)  must  present  his  health  record  with  the  current  signed  stamp  on  the  back.
(c)  Preventing  a  non-insured  person  from  easily  borrowinu  the  card  of  an  insured
individual.  In CASOP, members  had  photo  identification  cards,  a technology  that  is relatively
expensive  in Zaire.  The cards  were  feasible  for  CASOP  because  they  were  generally  needed
only  for  one  household  member,  the  premium  was higher  (100 Z per  month)  so that  the  cards
wcre  more  affordable,  and  getting  photographs  made  and  developed  is  relatively
straightforward  in  Kinshasa.
In Bwamanda,  identification  photographs  would  have  cost as much as the  insurance.  Instead,
control  relies  on  identifying  information  about  the  insured.  First,  his  health  card  contains
some descriptive  data  about  the  person  named  (age  and  height)  that  can  be matched  against
his or her appearance.  In addition,  the enrollment  register  contained  the names and  birth  dates
of other  family  members  about  which  the  presumed  insured  can  be quizzed.
(d)  Assuring  that  the  policy  of  enrolling  all  members  of  the  family  is  enforced.  In
Bwamanda,  as in some other  zones, the health  centers  endeavored  to maintain  up-to-date  cards
on all  persons  in their  catchment  area.  Provided  that  these  cards  were  up  to date,  they  create
a roster  for  each  family  at  the  time  of enrollment.
(e)  Assuring  that  patients  and  insurers  are  charged  appropriately  for  services  through  a
clcar  system  of  prices.  In  Bwamanda,  hospital  care  was charged  in  one  of  16 all-inclusive
prices  per  admission.  This  simplicity  reduces  the  risk  that  the  provider  will  perform
unnecessary  services  to overcharge  the  insurer.
5.  Appropriate  Investment  Strategies  Can  Prescrve  the  Value  of  Premium  Income over
the  Year
Because  of  the  high  rates  of  inflation  in  Zaire,  the  operation  of  insurance  poses  special
challenges.  In other  countries,  premium  income  could  be kept  in  cash  from  the  beginning  of
the  year,  when  it is <-llected,  until  the  middle  of  the  year,  when  it is spent.  In  Zaire,  where
the  rate  of  inflation  may  exceed  100% per  year,  this  approach  would  be ruinous.  Approaches
to  saving  money  without  major  erosion  by  inflation  include  investing  in a  responsible  local
institution.  For  example,  funds  invested  with  the CDI  at  Bwamanda  earned  a compound  rate
of  2.5 percent  per  month  in  1989 (34.5% effective  annual  yield).  It  may  also  be possible  to
invest  in drug  supplies,  provided  the  pharmacy  is well  run  and  drugs  are  safe.  As drugs  are
mostly  imported,  their  value  will grow  in proportion  to  the exchange  rate  with  their  country
of  origin.
6.  Financial Analysis of the Insurance System Requires Better Accounts
None  of  the  insurance  systems  visited  by  the  team  had  up-to-date  financial  statements  for
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was so incomplete that  no financial  statement could be constructed  for either  the polyclinic
or  the  insurance  system.  In Bokoro and  St. Alphonse, financial  statements  for  the health
centers could be constructed,  but premium income and expenses of insured patients  could not
be separated from the centers' other financial  transactions.  Bwamanda constructed  an annual
financial  statement  for the insurance plan at the end of each year, but it contained  so many
year end journal  entries  that no meaningful  analysis could be performed  mid-year.
Better financial  accounts would aid the insurance systems in setting premiums and controlling
costs, as well as providing  better data  to guide future  policies.
7.  A Financial  Guarantor  Can Help Build Confidence in Launching  an Insurance System
When a  new  insurance  system  is established,  many factors  could  precipitate  insolvency.
Accumulated  health  problems could lead to an  initial  burst of demand.  Inadequate  data  or
limited information  could lead to underestimation  of utilization  or prices.  An insurance plan
may incur fixed expenses despite low enrollment.  The public will be more likely to enroll in
an insurance  system if they are protected against these outcomes.  Many organizations  could
serve as a financial  guarantor.  In Bwamanda, the CDI served this role.  (Fortunately,  it was
never required  to make good on its guarantee.)
In the future  in Zaire, this study encourages existing organizations to serve as guarantor.  The
Government of Zaire, with support of PASS,  the SANRU program, Sante Pour Tous, UNICEF,
or a PVO might serve this role.  The financial  guarantee  need only be given for one year at
a time.  If there are losses, the premiums or services can be revised or, if necessary, the system
can be abandoned  to prevent further  losses.
C.  RESOURCE  MOBILIZATION
1.  Access and Resource Mobilization Motivated Health  Insurance Schemes
Health  insurance  systems  were  started  primarily  to  meet  two  objectives  concurrently:
mobilizing resources and increasing  access to services.  In the health  zones of Bwamanda and
Bokoro, the hospitals had  chronic or mounting deficits.  They felt  that substantial  increases
in user fees would price their services beyond the ability of the population to pay.  With health
insurance, ill persons would be more likely to seek care.  As evidence of the goal of increasing
access to health services, the insurance systems were promoted by developmental organizations
such as the Center for Integrated  Development in Bwamanda, the Development Committee of
St. Alphonse Parish in Kinshasa, and  the social welfare structure  of CASOP. In Bwamanda,
where  the  most  detailed  financial  statements  were  available,  the  share  of  the  hospital's
operating  costs recovered rose from 48% in 1985 to 79% in  1988.
D.  UTILIZATION AND ACCESS
1.  Evidence of  Adverse Selection and  Moral Hazard  was Found,  But Plans Minimized
Their  Impact
In every  plan  for  which  utilization  of  insured  and  uninsured  persons could be compared,
insured  persons were  found  to  use more services.  In Bwamanda, insured  persons were 6.7
times as likely as uninsured  to be hospitalized.  At Bekoro health center,  plan subscribers had
5.0 times as many new ambulatory episode as non-subscribers.  In the Kinshasa surveys, insured
respondents reported more previous visits (2.0) for their current  illness episode than uninsured
(1.6).  Similarly,  utilization  data  from  CASOP showed  more  visits  per  episode  among
individuals  insured  (2.5) than among those uninsured  (2.0).
While comparisons among the diverse insurance plans require  caution, this  evidence suggests
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only a modest impact on the intensity  of those services among those receiving some care.
Plans used several approaches  to minimize risk of adverse selection.  Several required  family
membership.  In Bwamanda,  Bokoro, CASOP, SNHR, and  now Masisi, if  one member of  a
family  joins,  then the  family  must join.  In REMEF, St. Alphonse, and  formerly  in Masisi,
there  was no such requirement.  (Policies for UPM were not known.)  This policy seemed to be
effective  in increasing enrollment overall, and members without special risk specifically.  As
plans  did  not graduate  premiums by age or prior  illness, the risk of adverse selection could
otherwise  be substantial.  Masisi found  that  in  its first  six months of operation,  enrollment
was low and a deficit  was incurred  and the zone has therefore  changed to family  enrollment.
Other  plans  enrolled  employee groups.  Employee groups constituted  100% of  members in
Bokoro and  80 percent  in  REMEF.  In CASOP, although  the share  of company  member is
unknown, they accounted  for  51% of visits  in  1989.  SNHR is also an  employee group  and
UPM is sponsored by workers'  unions.  This strategy  appears successful  in helping  to make
the  insurance  plan viable  and  should be encouraged  as one method of  recruiting  members.
It should not, however, be the exclusive method of enrollment,  as that  policy would exclude
the  bulk  of  the  rural  population.  In  Bwamanda rural  health  zone, for  example, only  4.6
percent  of the population  was employees or their  family  members.
Some plans limited enrollment  to a specified time of the year.  In Bwamanda, enrollment took
place only in March to April, after  the second harvest.  In St. Alphonse and CASOP, enrollment
was allowed at any time of the year, and in CASOP,  even when the subscriber  was ill.  Policies
to limit adverse  selection are most important  when adverse selection would be most severe.
This would occur when insured individuals  would receive substantial  discounts on infrequent,
expensive services. Thus, limiting the time of enroliment or restricting  enrollment at the time
of illness is important  in Bwamanda, where the insurance covered inpatient  care and chronic
illness, and in the CASOP.
2.  Systems of Utilization  and Cost Control Can Help Make Insurance Affordable
Several  systems of  utilization  and  cost control  have helped  to make  insurance  affordable.
Co-payments have been used by all of the systems visited.  In Bwamanda, the user generally
pays 20%; in Bokoro, 25%. In St. Alphonse and the CASOP, the payment schedules are more
complex,  but co-payments  average about  two thirds  of the costs.  Previously,  when CASOP
had no co-payments, they found that  outpatient  costs far  exceeded the share  of membership
fees available  to cover them, and the policy was changed.
Plans have also excluded certain services in an effort  to control costs. The Bokoro subscription
does not  pay for  ambulatory  care  of chronic  illnesses.  The Bwamanda  insurance  does not
cover initial  ambulatory  consultations  directly  with the physician.
Bwamanda  used  another  important  device  to  control  cost:  utilization  control,  through
insistence on the referral  system.  Before a patient  could be hospitalized,  the patient  had to
be referred  from a health  center  and a provider at the hospital had  to confirm  the need for
admission.
E.  INFORMAL ASSOCIATIONS
1.  Informal  Associations Financed  Health Care Only Through  Emergency Loan Funds
There are two types of informal  associations.  In a likelemba, or rotating  savings association,
each  participant  contributes  a  specified  amount  at  a  designated  frequency.  Among the
participants  surveyed in this study, the contribution  averaged $ 47.91 per month. One member
receives the entire  pool at each interval.  Members used the savings for business investment,
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expenses.
In a moziki, members not only make periodic savings into a pool, but also contribute regularly
into an emergency loan fund.  The pool financed  loans to members in cases of births, deaths,
marriages, or hospitalizations.  In a survey of 54 moziki members, 10 had received loans in the
past year, of  which  4 were related  to health  (births  or hospitalizations).  Borrowers repaid
loans without  interest.  In two moziki, members facing  extreme difficulties  could request a
special collection  from which the proceeds were given, not loaned, to the member in need.
F.  STRENGTHENING  EXISTING  INSURANCE  SYSTEMS
The  existing  insurance  systems, while vibrant  and  innovative,  could  benefit  from  several
steps.
1.  Training
Training  in the basic concepts and administrative  aspects of health insurance schemes should
be offered  at the School of Public Health, University of Kinshasa, at successfully functioning
systems such as Bwamanda, and through  refresher  programs offered  by FONAIMES,  SANRU
and the Sante Pour Tous project.  A manual about the management of health insurance  plans
should be developed for  this training.  The training  should consider both general principles
(how to calculate  premiums based on actuarial  data)  and  an analysis  of the experiences of
functioning  plans  in Zaire.
2.  Exchange Visits
An intra  zone program of staff  exchanges or site visits should be established.  The existing
systems could  invite  personnel from  nearby  zones to observe their  system and  adapt  their
forms and  procedures.  For example, under  the sponsorship of officials  for Equateur  Region,
the health  zones around  Bwamanda (e.g. Tandala  and Gemena) could be given assistance in
adapting  and replicating  the Bwamanda system.
3.  Information  Systems
Without a standardized  information  system and monitoring procedures, the costs and benefits
of a health  insurance  system are difficult  to evaluate  and almost impossible to compare with
other plans.  To help existing insurance  systems and  possible future  efforts,  an appropriate
coordinating  agency (SANRU, PASS,  or the Ministry of Health) should develop guidelines for
information  collection  which would assure that  utilization  and accounting data  are adequate
for evaluation  purposes (for example, availability  of utilization  and financial  data  by major
payment  categories: insured,  employed, uninsured  and unemployed).
Data analysis  was hindered  by  the fact  that  none of the  plans appeared  to have a unique
identifying  number for each member.  With decentralized  enrollment through  health centers
in  Bokoro and  Bwamanda, each health  center  tended to develop  its own numbering  system.
A comprehensive system would be easy to develop, in which the first  digits  represented  the
health  center, the middle digits the village and the family, and the last digits the individual.
4.  Technical  Assistance
Technical  assistance can help each plan tailor  the lessons learned  from the three areas above
to their  own site, and  to implement new accounting systems or policy changes.
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1.  Rural  Health  Insurance  Systems
This  study  suggests that  insurance  systems have  increased  access to  health  services  and
mobilized  resources  in  rural  areas.  Thus,  a  policy  goal is  to  foster  the  development  of
additional  systems to  serve other  parts  of  the country,  and  to gain  more experience  as to
which  approaches  work best in which  situations.  The study  suggests that  additional  rural
schemes be established  building on the lessons learned.  This study suggests initiating  varied
types  of  systems: some for  inpatient  care  only  (like  Bwamanda),  some for  inpatient  and
outpatient  curative care (like the intention for Bokoro), and others that are comprehensive and
include  preventive  services as  well (like  REMEF).  Th  training,  site  visits,  information
systems, and technical assistance recommended above to strengthen existing systems should be
extended  to encturage  new rural systems.
A model of  particular  interest  for  ambulatory  care  would be a  system of  prepayment.  A
member would prepay for  a specified  number ot  .mbulatory  episodes; say, five.  He would
receive a book of five vouchers.  The subscriber % uld be offered  a discount compared to the
current  charge in return  for having prepaid the services. The vouchers would be prc.inoted for
sale, like insurance,  at a time of the year when cash was most available.
2.  Urban  Health Insurance Systems
The Chief  of the Commission on the Organization  of Mutuals had been invited  to submit a
recommendation  for  consideration  by the government  for an  urban  hased  health  insurance
system.  Any  urban  based  systern is  likely  to  experience  high  utilization  and,  perhaps,
expectations  for high quality.
This study  suggests that  a hospital-based  HMO-type insurance  plan should be tested.  Civil
servants and their families would enroll on a family basis, paying a set premium which would
enable  them  to  seek  inpatient  care  in  case of  need  at  a  specified  hospital.  A separate
organization  would manage marketing efforts  for the plan, and would turn over a percentage
of the premium  payment  to the hospitals, based on subscribers.  The premium  would be set
high enough to cover the risk of  adverse selection.  Users would pay a co-payment for each
episode of hospital care.  Ambulatory care could be controlled either  through  co-payments or
through  a voucher system, like that  described above.
The  potential  advantage  of  this  approach  is that  it includes  mechanisms to direct  hospital
use to a particular  facility  and  to control utilization.  Utilization  rates should be projected
initially  based on the experience of other  large employers with similar  workers; the system
should then be refined  based on actual experience.
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66Administrative  Structure of the Zones and Managemnt  Systems
This appendix  describes the organization  of the facilities  that belong to the zones' networks.
The Zairian  health zones are organized according to the classical pyramidal  model (see Figure
1).  At the top of the set of providers  is the set of providers  is the reference  hospital which
provides  mostly inpatient  care  and  deals with  more complicated  health  problems.  At the
bottom of  the system are  the health  posts which  treat  more simple, ambulatory  cases, and
promote preventive programs.  Health centers and reference health centers are in intermediate
levels and provide a mix of ambulatory  and inpatient  services.
Linking  these four  levels of health  care units  is a system of referrals.  Patients  who canaot
be treated  at a given level due to the complexity of their  problem are sent to the level about
to seek treatment.
The medical and  administrative  activities  of  these four  categories of  health  care units  are
supervised  and  coordinated  to varying  extents  by the zone's central  office.  The nature  of
the relationships  between the above-mentioned  units varies among the zones.
Decisions at the health zone level are usually made by the health zone management committee,
usually presided over by the Medecin Chef de Zone.  Providers, health  centers, the reference
hospital and  the population  are usually represented  in this committee.
Decisions  concerning  the  set  of  health  centers  are  usually  made  at  the  health  centers'
management  committee,  where  the  population,  providers,  and  health  centers'  technical
personnel are represented.  The Medecin Chef de Zone normally chairs this committee.
Technical  and  administrative  activities  of  the ref:rence  hospital  are  usually decided  and
coordinated  by the hospital  management committee, co-chaired by the hospital director  and
the Medecin Chef de Zone.
The population  plays an active role at the health center level through the health centers health
committees. Usually, each health center has its own committee made of community volunteers.
They play  a  major  role in  controlling  the  health  center's  accounting,  and  are essential  at
promoting activities  such as health education and  sanitation.
The central  office supervises the medical and administrative  activitics  that take place in the
health  centers.  Supervision  involves periodic  trips  to the facilities  by the Medecin Chef  de
Zone and  other  doctors  and  nurses of  the central  office.  In exchange  for  its supervisory
services, the central office  charges a fee to the health  centers.
The supervision  fee may be the same for  all health  centers or  may vary  depending  on the
volume of activities  of each individual  facility.  for example, in Kalonda, each health center
paid a monthly supervision  fee of 400% in  1985. In Kirotshe  they paid 10%  of their monthly
revenue, excluding  that  from the sale of drugs.  In Dungu in  1986, health  centers pay to the
central  office  50% of  their  monthly  revenue,  drugs  excluded.  Finally,  in  Bokoro,  the
supervision fee paid by each center is proportional to the population of the center's health area
and to the number of new curative  cases treated  in the facility.
In addition  to its  supervisory  role, the central  office  performs  a  series of  other activities
which  permit  the functioning  of  the zone's  health  network.  The other  activities  include
accounting, financial  and technical planning, drugs and material purchasing and management,
training  of the zone's employees and coordination  of immunization activities.  The supervision
fees are  generally insufficient  to finance  the expenses attributable  to that  activity  and are
only a small fraction  of the central office's  total  expenses.
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68With regard  to the supply of  materials, health  centers purchase the majority  of their  drugs
and medical supplies from a central pharmacy which is usually managed by the central office.
In some zones the central  office  changes the health  centers a mark-up above purchase price
which helps finance its operating costs. In other zones, the office  acts only as an intermediary
and does not charge any  fee for its role of supplier.  The proportion of drugs and materials
that  the health  centers purchase from  other local suppliers  is usually small.
The major relationship  between health  centers  and  the hospital  is the referral  of patients.
In most cases, patients  are referred  to the hospital at no cost to the health  center.  In a few
cases, however, health  centers do have to pay a fee to the hospital for each referral.  Such a
fee is set by the hospital  to discourage  health  centers from  referring  patients  whose health
problems can be treated  at the health center level.  In Kikimi, such a payment was SZ in 1985,
which obviously did not cover the costs generated  by the referred  patient.  Kindu  is another
example of a zone where the health  centers have to pay the hospital  for  referred  cases.  In
1985, the hospital  received 75,900Z ($1,500) worth of referral  fees.
Finally,  the reference  hospital  is intended  to be a financially  independent  unit and its only
formal  relationship  with  the central  office  is, in most cases, the purchase of drugs.
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LIST  OF PRICES  1988 AND  1989
BWAMANDA  REFERENCE  HOSPITAL
AND  HEALTH  CENTERS
M0Ld"  MJ  6  . M  A04WAd  "-  "  4.
NOPZL  MMUL  DE REF=C
TAB  W>S  D  SO2NS  3ICAUX  A LIOPIThL  WJMAYA
A PARTR DU  Z7/04/1989
No  DEIMIATI  Dr SOXNS  |CA.  CATROO  R I E
_A*  So  DQRE  DE  V  ON
RECENSE  *=3UMLE  RMSE  S0CS
OS  ?6diatris  I  1.500  s  300 s  3.000  s  3.750  s
02  P4dLtriLe  U  (boins  z  tumasifu)  2,500  a  500 *  5.000  a  6,250  a
03  Xdectiao  Intere  I  (Ambulatoire)  3,000  s  600 s  6.000  u  7.500  a
04  X6docino Interne  U1 (Hosp1tcllgat°2  4.500  a  900 a  9.000  s  £1,250  5
0-5  X6doo1ue  Intenme  III  (S.  ntemsifoj  6.500  s  1.300  s  13*000 a  16.250  s
06  C4iwgio  I  3.500  . 700s  7.000  a  8,750  a
07  trirzio  s1  7.000  a  I,400.  14,000  5 27.500  s
08  Cirurgie  III  8,500  a  1700  s  17,000  s  22.250  s
"09  0hMiazrge Iv  (ur6ence)  10,000  s  2.000  s  209000 a  259000 s - £0  hteoiiite  avee  C,oPN.  1,500  z a  r  ia  u It  3.000 a  3,750 a
. Mte±stEf  safs  C.P.e.  4.500  a  4*500 s  9,000  s  1Z1250 s
£2  Oa6colgde  °  4,500  :  9005  9,000  s  11S250  5i
S3  34.U44.  ohTm±ques  +T3C  lb  1Lge  2,000  a  .400 s  4,000  S 5,000 S
E4  TBC  2frn  lgne  5,000  s  1.000  s  10,000  121.500  £
Ext5  taction  dentairo  +  Cireonco1aon  1.000  . 200  s  2.000  a  2.500  s
16  0ormiltation  Privie  at  Esmcn.
*  I d:  ptltaue  epbgsioque  3.000  a.  3.000 a  3.000  a  7.500  5
0CSUVAT120NS  I*  L'soeoucohmux* cut  gatudt  pour  lee  fa.on  qu±  ant szu1v  le"  C.P.N
e t  quA sont  mambres de ls  gutuel.-_
2.  Caabre  ftUvil  e1le  s  250  .
3.  riz  t'.'A  ffllation  (Xutiello)  I  125  S/an
ISIt  & JSWl&02  15/04/989
1001 &Es0W.  DI031  DI L&  03
DM  SANTE  PURAIZ  WWL
70  *  Da.  FPDZl01rVS  I .
K6decn-Qaf  4.omeTarif  des sois  sedicaux  a partir  du  15 gvril  1989
,***  W4.  aibId  I  .*.I.iLL.  U.  1uJgAM#II%IIUA
CDI - 8WAMANDA
0.P. 11 CEMENA.
TAItIF  OES SOINS ME3ICAUX AUX CENTRES OE
SANTE A PARTIR OU 15 AVRIL 1989.
C A  T E C O  R  I  E
OESIGNATIOtJ  uE SOIN5  EC  T E  S
R  Rocons6as  N. Roe.
01. Consultat 0 Enfant t  Eleve  200 z.  400  600  z  1.000  z
02. Consultation adulte  400 z  800 z f  1.000 z  2.000 z
03. Consultation Pr4natale +
Nzissance d4sirable  j  400 z  400 Z  400z400  z
04. Consultation gr6scolaire  200 z  200 z  l  200 z  200 z
05. Fiches  familioles  I  G  R  A  T  U  I  T
06. Carts de recensoment  1  20 Z
07. Pharmacis famili2le (sa-  I
chet nivaquine +  aspirine)  I  z
08|O  Vente condom  p  e  10  4
0o.  .Mladies  chroniqucs  2000 z.&  4000 Z  5000 z  i  10.000 I
|  "  ~Los  membres du la mutuelle Payent  400  z  I  ~~~~~~  - I_
OEt,W01VATIONS:
•  Les fruls de traitement de maladies chroniques  no  couvrent pas lis au-
tres episode  de maladies  .
•  Los malades Cont l'6tat nicessitO uns ficho d'hospitalisotion au Centre
de  5ant6 do :Rof6rence  (transfusion9perfusion,tr:Ltement filairo,...)
payOnt une dauxi6me  quittance,
Falt a  Swomanda.le  13/Avril/1889
POUR LE  COIMTE DE CESTION OZ  LA ZONE
DE SANTZA  RURALE DE  0WAMANDA
OR,  FREODtY MODENS
t16docin-Chof  de Zone.
71Tarif  des  soins  medicaux a I'hopital  a partir  ler  fevrier  88
ZONE  DE SANTE  HUIJ1LL  EJL  L.JuiM0NUM
HOPITAL GENERAL  DE REFERENCE
8.P.  11  GEMENA
TARIF  DES SOINS MEDICAUX A L'HOPITAL  GENERAL  OE
REFERENCE  DE BWAMANOA  A  PARTIR
OU let  FEVRIER  88t
C*XNXUXSX--x-XBx
DESIGNATION DE SOINS  C A T E G  O R I E
Recens6 Membre  de l  Mutuulle  N.Rec;  Soci6t
i.(2  3)12.(10%)  3.(S%)
|01.  Pediatrie  600 z  120 z 10  Z  30 z  1.200  1.600
02.  Midocine  Interne  Am ul1000  z  200  z  Z  SO z  2.000  3.000
03.  Mtdecine Interne hOSp,  100  Z  350  zt  20  z  100  z  3.600 4.800
IC4.  Gymttcologie  1800  z  3SO z  160 a  100  2  3.600  4.800
OS.  Maternit6 avec  CPN  SOO  z  G ri  a  t u  11  t  1.000  2.000
06.  Materniti  sans  CPN  t500  z  1.500  2  1500  SSOO  z  3,000  4.500
07, Chirurgie  I  1000  :  200  Z  t30  z  SO0  z  2.000  3.000
oe.  Chirurgie II  2500 z  SOO z!2S0 2  120 z  4.000  6.000
09, Chirurgie  III  3000 z  600  z 300 z  150  z  S.000  7.000
10. Chirurgie  Iv (ur:ence)  3500  z  700  'z 350  z  I180  z  6.000 a.000
II.  TSC +  malaoies chron.  750  z  <-_--  ISO  z  --------  1.500 2.200
12.  TGC 2eme ligne  11500 z  _-------  300  z ------- t  3.000 4.500
13.  Consultations  ,:rvc5s  11200  z  E---fl200  z  -------- 1.200 2.500
2Q1ERMAI0NS: 1.  Pour  lcs femmes  ayent  suivi  les  Consultations  Pr6-Natales,
liaccouchement  *st gratuit  i condition  d'ttre  membre  de la
Mutuelle.
2, La  circoncision  cst gratuite  pour Is bib6 Clune semaine.
Au-061i  de cet  tge,10  tarif  de la p6oiatri  otst  d'eoplice-
h;1 c  I  .
3,  Chamnrc  priv6e:  ZOO z/Jour.
L  tL,XurO  I :Centrcs  ce Sant6 axe  ISA8E-M9ARI
CLounc  2:Centras  do Sant6  dc:  Boto-Kassongo-9ombis-BOVaZi-
- Songbads  et  Booamo . '
rouou 3:Ccntes  die  Sant6  de:  Bobandu-Solumbc-9aowara-Bobisi
9ombisao-owskara-Sombilii
Fait  a Bwsmanda,le  24 Janv.1988
POUR LE COMITE D0  L.r.T1Ctj  r) LA  POUR  LES ADMINISTRATEURS
ZONE DE SA'JTE  DU  w 1rnfJDA  DU CDT - BWAMArDA  AsOl
5  '!  :  EL2  BETYNA  NGILASE GOELE - DOLO
A0MItJISTRATEUR-CHEP0E  PR0ETTarif des soins medicaux aux centres de unte a partir  ler fevrier  88
REPUBLIOUE DU ZAIRE
ZONE DE SANTE RURALE DE OWAMANDA
CDS- eWAMANOA
9P*.  t1 GECENA-
TARIF DES SOINS MEOICAUX  AUX CENTRES DE SANTE
A PARTIR  U 01.ir  FEVRIER 88S
UK-  XUXUU- x-  ZxUEUxMxSx-xx
C  A  T  E  G  O  R  I  t
DESIGNATION  DE SOINS  -
__Rens________  _QCIE_Recen  6  '.R  c ns6SOC
Recens_ es_  N.  R9ecen.
01. Consultation  Enfant+Elive  100,- z  200,- 2  200,- a  400,- z
02. Consultation  Aaulte  200,- z  400,- 2  400,- 2  600.-  Z
03. Consultations  Pr6natales  +
Naissances  d6sirables  200,-  z  200,- z  200,- z  200,- z
14. Consultations  Pr6scolairos  100o- z  100o- z|  iao,- z  100,- z
OS. Fiches  familialos  G R A T U I T
06. Carte Rocenccment  --------  -------- i  z  …----------…
;07.  Pharmacie  Familialo  …  ----------------- 20,jO z  - …-----------
(sachet  nivocuine/aspirini)
Sachot SPO,Condom  -----------------  20,00  2  --  ----  - --
08. Maladie  chronique  C  A  T  E  G  O  R  I  E
Recense imemore  de  la mu,  hon,Rec  SOCtETES
R  tuelle  Rec  N.Rec.
750,-  z.  150,o  z  s1o00 !150  000,
0OSERVAT!CNS:
•  Los frais dx traitumcnt  do  maladies  chroniques  no couvrent  pas  les autres
6pisodos  do  m:;5Idius.
•  I.es  moloccs  cr.t  1'1tat  n6ccssito une fiche  d'hospitalisation  au Centra de
Sant6 me n6f6r.nne  (transfusion,purfusion,traitement  filsire...) payent
une  deuxijmc  quittonce.
Falt  6  Bwamenda,le  24  Janv.1988
POUR LE COMITE  DE CESTrON DCE  LA  POUR LES ADMINISTRATEURS
ZONE OC SANTE nRUALE OWAMANDA  DU COI - SWAMANDA Asbl
OR,  vAnT  CnICL  BETYNA NOILASE GeELE - DOLO
Mr.FDECIN-C,r  Cr. ZC¶E  AOMINISTRATEUR-CHCF  DE  PROJET
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EXCHANGE  AND  INFLATION  RATES






11989 is an  8 month  average,  Jan.-Aug.
Source:1985:  Zaire  Ponulation.  Health  and  Nutrition  Segtor  Revige.  Report  No. 7013-ZR,
World Bank, May 15, 1989.
1986:  World Bank Office  in Washington, D.C.
1987-1989: World Bank Office  in Kinshasa,  Zaire
Average Annual Exchange Raltes: Zaires to US Daollars  and Belgian Francs
$1 U.S.  I BF
1986  61.0  1.6
1987  128.3  3.8
1988  187.0  5.1
1989  354.2  8.9  (Average  for  8 months,  Jan.-Aug.)
Nov. 89  430.0
Source:  1986: World Bank  Office,  Washington,  D.C.
1987-1989: World  Bank Office  in  Kinshasa,  Zaire
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DOCUMENTATION FOR BWAMANDA  HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN
1.  Control Sheets for  Stock of Membershin Stamns
Control  sheets are filled  out  in duplicate,  with one copy kept by the administrator  and one
copy kept at the health center.  Each time the health  zone administrator  makes a control visit
to the health  center during  the inscription  period, he updates both copies of the control form.
The health  center nurse then signs the copy kept by the administrator,  and the administrator
signs the copy kept by the health center  nurse.
Example:
IOuent. |Ouant.  Iouant.|  lRemnIn  I  I
DateIRecv'dJStock IValue  ISold  IValuel  der  Ivalue  ISIfoture
................................................................
27/211,000  11.000  11250001 --  I  I  1.000  11250001
................................................................
07/31  ...  I  - I  --  1193  1247501 802 11002501
14/31  300 11,102 11377501  426  1532501  676 1 845001
,  ...........................................................
2.  Membershig  Register  for  Bwamanda  InsurancePan
As each member pays the inscription  price, the health center  nurse registers the new member
in a registration  notebook, organized  by village.
In the sample register  page shown below, three  numbers are assigned to each member.  The
first  number ("Cen.")  is the census number, given to each household during  the medical census.
The second number ("Order") is a sequential  number given to each individual  who joins the
plan from a given village. Thus, there is a membership number  P" for each village. The thira
number is a number given to each family,  again sequential  within each village.  The lack of
unique membership numbers is an impediment to data analysis and evaluation of the insurance
plan.
The field  for 'family  composition'  shows the individual's  position in the family, e.g. "F" for
father,  'WI'  for first  wife, 'W2" for second wife, 'C" for child, etc.
The field  for 'attendance  at the hospital" indicates the date of hospitalization  and the service
where the member was hospitalized  (for example,  MLIA'  is Internal  Medicine, Ambulatory).
Exmp.:
~,.  ................................  ....  ......
No.  I  No.  I  I  Fmtly |  Old  |  Atten-
-------------. I  f-  I  I  I  Cowp-  mb.  daoce
Can.  I Order  I  lty  I  1i_e  I Age  I os.tfoni  Numberl  at  hosp.
................................................................
35  |  1  1  1  Yutonego | 6O  yrl  F  1 35  |
2  1  1 K  ea  I  SO  yrl  WI  I  35  I
3  w  19  yrano  g.  9y  I  C
|  4  §  |  Yuku  47yrl  W2  l
25  |  5  2  |  Soongs  |29  yrl  F  |  25  1  18/9 MIA
................................................................
753.  HosDitalizat;on Notebook
Another  important  source of  information  about hospitalized  patients  is the hospita:ization
notebook (Cahier d'hospitalisation),  filled  out at the hospital admitting/billing  office,  when
the  patient  registers.  The  notebook  contains  the  patient's  name,  village,  sex,  date  of
hospitalization,  hospital service, amount paid, and  three  identification  numbers.  The first
ID number is a unique, sequential patient  number.  The second number is the census number
from  the household  medical  census.  The  third  number  is the insurance  plan  membership
number,  where  the  patient  is  a  member  of  the  Bwamanda  Insurance  Plan.  A  separate
hospitalization  notebook is kept for the maternity  service.
4.  Billinz
After  having paid the hospitalization  fee, patients  receive a receipt, which  is stapled to the
medical  record,  as proof  of  payment.  Different  color  receipts  are  used  for  each  payor
category.  A second copy of  the  receipt  is kept  in a  receipt  book at the admitting/billing
office  and used to calculate  total receipts by payor category at the end of each day.
If a patient  cannot pay the full price of a hospitalization,  the patient  may still be admitted
if  he or she can afford  at least half of the hospitalization  fee (it is rare that  patients  arrive
at  the hospital  with  less than  half  of the  fee).  A special  'Advances'  notebook is kept  to
register  the  payments  of  patients  who  cannot  pay  the  full  amount  at  the  time  of
hospitalization.  The procedures for collection of the remainder of the fee, once a patient has
been hospitalized, are ad hoc.  The responsibility  usually falls to the nursing staff  to get the
patient  to pay the remainder  of his or her account.  Hospital accounting  procedures do not
capture  free  care or bad  debt, so these expenses are not  reported  in the hospital  financial
statements.
5.  Financial  Records and Reoorts  for Insurance Plan
Two  forms  are  attached  which  are  used  for  recording  financial  information  about  the
Bwamanda Insurance Plan.  The first  form ("Releve Mensuel Mutuelle  19..') is used to record
monthly hospital and health center charge3 incurred for members of the insurance plan.  The
second form ("Situation Mutuelle 1988"  --  also used for  1989)  records all financial  transactions
(deposits, withdrawals,  interest  payments).  Usually one line is used per month.  The form is
being revised, currently,  to increase flexibility  in recording transfers  of funds.
76Releve Meusuel
Z.S.R.  - bWAMANOA
B.P,  11  GNA  RELEVE  NENSUEL  MUTUELLE  10...
_____________________  me.  o_ ___________
....  .
HOPITAL  GENERAL  DE REFERENCE  9WAMANOA  _  CENTRES  DE  SANTE
NOI  DESIGNATIONS  GROUPE  NOMBRE!  MONTANT  NI  re  Tot  N/CENTRE
01lPEOIATRIE  I  I  X**  |sl.XAS  ?2  1 2  .5..x  !t  i.  ...  'xi  9o
|  |  §,/Totol:  AtS  .. =fl  ....  1  *  . ..
!02  CHIRURGIE  z  ........ ~~~~I  |ISI  j  .XZ....  Z  ....... !  S/Total  I
03i  IC,IRURCIE  2  ....  z
I  S/Total  ........
- - _. _  _  _  ....... z; 
II  X..,z,  ... Zi
06  CHIRURGIE  3  I
S/Total:  "  '  i"  ' *w  *-  *.i  s
1-  --  --  I  - - ,  *~~~-g-----------  s--
05  CHIRURGIE  4  Lon  IIf.G 4 .... AZAIl
'III  ,x  ,z  ,,  z  ~ProportonAfit
.. _  S/TotFF  '  j  per  group
I  ~~~~~~  ~~~~~~~~Total;  . ... MEDECINE  INTER-J I  X..  . ...  Gul...  I
0 6 !NE  AMflBUt.ATIRE  II  ,.X  ...  Z
S/TotOl  **II  d  GrouPe  3:....
0  MEDECINE  INTER-;  II  *.X.**z  ...  Z
°NE H.?QPJTALISA-I  III  I  X..Z|  *.Z
S/Total  :  /  /  I  /  /
OICGYNECOLOGIE  Is  .. x...z  i
S  !  '  ~~~~~~~~S/Total  7  /  , 
I;9  1ATERNITE  X  ...  I
10Tc:  lire  ligne  . .. 
I  !-*  I  i  I I  IIITOC:  2imS  lignm  .. 
TOTAL  I  *  - --  w  i  I
|TOTAL  GEN.(HGR  R  CoS.) /-7
77Situation Mutuelle
ZONE DE  SANTE RURALE DE  SWAMANDA
S.P. 11  CEMENA
REPUELIOUE DU  ZAIRE-
SITUAT.ON  Ml JELLE  195d
--  ,  - - - - i  * ~~~~~~~RLMUOURSEL
PERIODE  REPORT  RETRAITS  CAPITAL  INTERE  MONTANT| MENT..  OTAL
19e8  198 7  |  DEeUT PER  ,  3%  CAPITALIA  HMRC, S.
.. . _  . .T  _  . __-_I
... ~~~~  -- 1_.*,  .
. ~ ~  _  __  _  _I  I  I  _  __  __  I  ___  _  _  _  _
. _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  ___  ,_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  I j_1-  '  _'  _  - i_I
M  __~__  -- !____  - -
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